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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Civil war and its resolution
Human societies have suered from violent conicts since ancient times,
ranging from minor squabbles between neighboring villages to disastrous in-
terstate wars [1]. Especially, the last century saw the tremendous loss of
human life in interstates conicts: the World Wars, the Vietnam War, the
Korean War, to name a few. Today while interstate wars as large as the
World Wars are not observed, civil war, which occurs between the govern-
ment of a state and internal opposition groups, is a principle source of human
insecurity [2]. Fig. 1.1 shows that civil war has increased since the end of
the World Wars and became much more frequent than interstate war. This
is partly because of the increase of collapsed states in Africa and Asia [3].
After the World Wars, many former colonies achieved independence because
of the change of international norms. However, many of them soon lapsed
into autocracy, failed in economic policy, but temporally survived with the
external support in the context of the Cold War. The collapse of such frag-
ile states precipitated civil war, but civil war frequently resulted in another
fragile government. As a result, the countries were trapped in the poverty
and conict [4].
Though most of civil wars erupt in developing countries, this does not
mean that civil war is irrelevant for developed countries. For example,
conict-torn countries can be a breeding ground for terrorism and disease.
The September 11 attacks in 2001 by Al-Qaeda members from war-torn
Afghanistan is one of the most well known cases. The terrorist attacks in
Paris in November 2015 by the self-declared Islamic State member is an-
other typical case. The containment of Ebola virus epidemic in 2014 would
have been much more dicult if Sierra Leone and Liberia had been in civil
war as they actually were in 1990s. In addition to realistic benets, the
prevention and resolution of civil war to save life of thousands of innocent
citizens are the responsibility of the whole international community from
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Figure 1.1: Number of ongoing armed conicts by type, in 1946{2014,
adopted from [2]. Civil war is divided into two categories, intrastate and
internationalized. In the latter case, other states intervene in the conict in
the form of troops, while they do not in the former. Extrastate conicts are
imperial or colonial wars. Each armed conict resulted in 25 battle-related
death in a calender year. See Ref. [2] for more detailed denitions.
the humanitarian view point.
Actually, the international community have supported conict resolution
by various means, including peace talks mediation, peace keeping operations
(PKOs), and military interventions. These eorts, however, often fail to
prevent civil conicts or to stop them, and many of them resumed soon
even once peace was temporally achieved [5]. To design and implement
more successful conict resolution, we need more sound understating of civil
conict.
1.2 Organizational studies of armed groups
Until recently, the main focus of conict studies was the onset and ter-
mination of civil war: what causes and ends civil war [6{8]. In contrast,
current conict studies pay more attention to the conict process: what
happens between the outset and the termination of conict. For example,
what type of violence is committed by whom against whom is an important
question [9]. Variation of the types includes whether the violence is indis-
criminate or discriminate [9], and whether sexual violence is committed or
not [10]. Geographical diusion of rebellion is another topic of research in
this direction [11{13]. Civil war does not bring about violence uniformly
in the country. Intensity of violence varies over time and space. Therefore
understanding the patterns of the geographical diusion is important for
both counterinsurgency and the protection of civilians.
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These studies of the conict process showed that microscopic details of
armed groups matter a lot for macroscopic patterns of the conict process.
For example, Kalyvas showed that types of violence is strategically deter-
mined by armed groups, based on the current situation of their territorial
control [9]. Zhukov showed that the spreading of violence is aected by lo-
gistical constrains of armed groups, such that they need to move along road
networks [11]. As a result, organizational studies of armed groups is now a
burgeoning area of study: how they are formed, recruit combatants, raise
funds, procure weapons, and commit violence [14,15].
Though detailed description of armed groups itself is not new [16, 17],
the current organizational studies pay more attention to the systematic com-
parison of armed groups and the causes and eects of their organizational
characters. For example, Weinstein showed variety of organizational struc-
ture among four specic armed groups: National Resistance Army (NRA) in
Uganda, Renamo in Mozambique, Sendero Luminoso Nacional and Sendero
Luminoso-Huallaga in Peru [14]. NRA and Sendero Luminoso Nacional are
much more disciplined than Renamo and Sendero Luminoso-Huallaga. As a
result, the former built better governance, committed less violence, and were
more resilient than the latter. Weinstein also argued that some groups are
ill-disciplined because they are of rich economic endowment (e.g., natural
resource or support from the foreign countries). The endowment makes it
dicult for them to screen out members who are not passionate about their
political goal but just interested in the economic benet. Inclusion of such
members inevitably undermines the discipline of the groups. Staniland also
pointed out the organizational diversity of armed group [15]. His main case
studies covers conicts in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Southeast
Asia. He categorized insurgent groups into four types: integrated, vanguard,
parochial, and fragmented. As shown in Table 1.1, the type depends on the
strength of ties among leaders (horizontal ties) and those between leaders
and local communities (vertical ties). He argued that the type of insurgent
groups is determined by their prewar social base. For example, urban stu-
dent groups tend to result in vanguard insurgent groups, while local village
strong men tend to form parochial groups.
1.3 Changes of armed groups over time
Furthermore, the organizational characters of armed groups changes over
time. Though the changes of armed groups are pointed out in several stud-
ies [14, 16, 18], the work of Staniland is unique in the strong emphasis on
the phenomena [15]. He argued typical changes of insurgent types and their
causes. For example, parochial groups, which are composed of loosely con-
nected leaders who have strong ties with their own local communities, often
turn into integrated groups by factional fusing under external support. Is
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Table 1.1: Types of insurgent groups: the strength of ties and examples [15].
type horizontal ties vertical ties example
integrated strong strong Viet Cong
vanguard strong weak Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917
parochial weak strong Pakistani Taliban
fragmented weak weak Red Brigades in Italy in the 1970s
is also common, however, that parochial groups get fragmented because of
leadership feuds.
One of the most obvious changes of the organization of armed groups is
their ssion-fusion: armed groups split or merge into dierent groups. Not
only is it common [19{22], it also largely aects the conict process. The
dynamics has signicant implications for those who try to build peace be-
cause it complicates conicts and makes their resolution much harder [23].
A typical example is its negative eects on peace negotiation: when a peace
agreement is signed among armed groups, emergence of splinter groups, even
minor ones, that oppose the agreement frequently prevent its implementa-
tion [24{27]. Furthermore, ssion-fusion dynamics during the course of the
conict aects the stability of post-conict society. For example, Rudlo
and Findley showed that conicts during which splintering of rebel groups
occurred tend to have resumed sooner [28]. Their analysis controlled the
number of rebel groups that ght the conicts, therefore splintering itself
matters.
The ssion-fusion dynamics is also signicant for those who seek a mil-
itary victory. For leaders of armed groups, it is an important matter how
to prevent fragmentation of their own groups and promote that of ene-
mies [15, 29, 30]. External supporters of armed groups are also aected by
the dynamics. Armed groups are often supported by the government of a
neighboring state or diaspora communities, either covertly or overtly [31,32].
For the patrons, how to integrate their multiple clients into a cohesive armed
group that can defeat the enemy, is a crucial question.
Fission-fusion of armed groups, however, has been investigated quan-
titatively only by several recent works. It is argued that the dynamics is
aected by battle eld outcomes, local rivalries, patronage networks, third
party mediation, and repression against armed groups [20, 22, 33, 34]. As
noted previously, the negative eects of ssion-fusion on post-conict soci-
eties is also studies [28].
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1.4 Existing data on armed groups
A major obstacle in studies of ssion-fusion of armed groups is the lack
of data. On the one hand, there is an increase of conict datasets re-
garding the armed groups [35]. For example, Armed Conict Location
and Event Dataset (ACLED) records violence committed by armed groups
with higher time and space resolution than previous datasets [36, 37]. Pro-
Government Militias Database (PGMD) includes details of pro-government
militias, which has gained less attention than insurgent groups [38, 39].
The Sexual Violence in Armed Conict (SVAC) dataset collects informa-
tion about perpetration of sexual violence by armed groups, which has been
studied almost only in qualitative methods [40,41].
On the other hand, only a few existing data contain genealogical informa-
tion, i.e., when, which armed group split/merged into which groups. One of
them is the Uppsala Conict Database Program (UCDP) Actor dataset [42].
The UCDP has collected various datasets on armed conicts since 1946:
years of onset and termination, incompatibility, battle-related deaths, and
means of termination, among others. Among the datasets, the UCDP Ac-
tor dataset lists armed actors who fought the armed conicts since 1946.
It also identies whether a group was created by splintering or merger of
other group(s), and if so, its original group(s). Therefore the UCDP Actor
dataset partially includes genealogical information of armed groups. How-
ever, the data does not tell us when the splintering or merger occurred.
Similar decits are fond in the data on splintering of armed groups collected
by Christia [20]. It is another comprehensive data, which covers civil wars
that erupted between 1816{2007. Her data enumerates which armed groups
experienced splintering among those who fought the civil wars. However,
the data also does not always identify when the splintering occurred and
does not contain information on merger of armed groups.
In some cases, a temporally aggregated data is enough: for example you
can investigate the relationship between the total number of ssion-fusion
events in a conict and the stability of post-conict society. However, tem-
porally disaggregated (i.e., time series) data have a potential to improve
our understanding. It may tell us more about the mechanism of the ssion-
fusion dynamics. The stability of post-conict society may be dierent if the
time series of the ssion-fusion is dierent even with the same total num-
bers of events. Now that temporally disaggregated data on battles actually
advanced the understanding of conict dynamics [11, 12], it is reasonable
to expect the potential of temporally disaggregated data on ssion-fusion
events.
In contrast to the two datasets introduced above, Kenny collected a
data focusing on two insurgent groups: the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in
Northern Ireland and the Karen National Union (KNU) in Myanmar [43].
Fig. 1.2 shows his data on the fragmentation processes: when, who splin-
10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Figure 1.2: Fragmentation process of the IRA (top) and the KNU (bottom),
adopted from [43].
tered from or reintegrated into IRA and KNU. Though the data is valuable
in studying the development of the IRA and the KNU and other groups
who originated from the two, it does not cover other armed groups who did
not originated from them but fought the same conicts. It is common that
armed groups of completely dierent origins get integrated and the integra-
tion largely aects the course of conict [44]. Recent studies also imply that
interaction between armed groups of completely dierent origins has crucial
eects on the conict process, including peace negotiations [23]. Therefore,
it is more desirable that data on ssion-fusion covers all armed groups in a
conict regardless of what origin they have.
Another minor room for improvement of data is the inclusion of more
various patterns of ssion-fusion. Existing data only record splintering of a
group and integration of multiple groups and do not include more complex
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cases, in which part of armed groups splintered and immediately join other
groups. The dynamics, which we call side-switching, is commonly observed
in conict [29]. A ssion-fusion data that includes such events will tell us
more realistic picture of the dynamics.
1.5 Aims of the present research
To overcome the weakness of the existing datasets, it is desired to collect
new datasets on genealogy of armed groups that identify points of time of
ssion-fusion events, cover all the warring parties in the conict, and contain
various types of ssion-fusion, i.e. splintering, integration, side-switching,
etc. Such datasets have potential to tell us the mechanism of the ssion-
fusion dynamics and its impacts on conict outcomes.
Collection of a data satisfying the conditions for all armed conicts by
the author is dicult because of time and budget constraints. Therefore, as
a rst step, this research focuses on a specic case: collection and analysis
of a genealogical data of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) conict since 1996. It is true that we need datasets covering a wider
range of cases to study the impact of the ssion-fusion dynamics on conict
outcomes and to investigate whether there is an universal mechanism of
ssion-fusion dynamics across dierent civil wars. The study of the DRC
case, however, will tell us some information on the mechanism of ssion-
fusion dynamics in the specic conict and provide us a starting point for
broader investigation of the impact and universal characters of the dynamics.

Chapter 2
Case history
2.1 An overview of the DRC conicts
Figure 2.1: A map of the DRC, adopted form [45].
The DRC is a country in Central Africa (see Fig. 2.1) that has the
second largest territory in Africa and 81 million population today [45]. This
section review the history of the DRC and the conicts (See Table 2.1).
The DRC was a colony of Belgium until its independence in 1960. Im-
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Table 2.1: A chronology of the DRC
year event
1908 Establishment of Belgian Congo as an ocial Belgian colony
1960 Independence and the eruption of the Congo Crisis
1965 Mobutu coup
1990 Declaration of the introduction of multi-party democracy
1994 Massive inow of Rwandan refugees after the genocide
1996 Eruption of the First Congo War
1997 Overthrow of the Mobutu regime
1998 Eruption of the Second Congo War
1999 Lusaka Peace Agreement
2001 Assassination of President Laurent-Desire Kabila
2002 Pretoria Peace Agreement
2003 Formation of the transitional government
2006 Inauguration of President Joseph Kabila
mediately after its independence, the country fell into chaos of civil war,
the Congo Crisis. A cause of this turmoil is the lack of preparation for
independence: Belgium gave the Congolese leaders only ve months and
fundamental issues of the new nation had not been determined, especially
whether to adopt federalism or not. Leaders from the areas with rich min-
eral resources, especially Katanga, who did not want to share the benet
from mining industry with other areas and therefore preferred federalism,
declared secession from the Congo soon after the independence. Over the
following years several rebellions were launched across the country and they
were nally put down only with the help of Belgium, the US, and the UN.
Even after the military crisis was over, a political deadlock ensued. Be-
cause of political rivalry, President Kasa-Vubu tried to replace Prime Min-
ister Tshombe with Evariste Kimba, but the Parliament, which supported
Tshombe, refused it. In the paralysis of the government, Mobutu Sese Seko,
chief of sta of the army, seized power in a coup. He was supported by the
US because of his anti-communist stance. His dictatorship lasted until the
1990s, during which the economy and governance of the DRC was destroyed.
When the DRC reintroduced a multi-party political system in 1990,
ethic tension arose all over the country, especially in Eastern Congo. In the
area, Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, both of which had immigrated from
Rwanda, and other autochthonous groups (e.g. Hunde in North Kivu and
Bembe in South Kivu) had been in conict over political rights and land
tenure. Rwandan immigrants were prevented from running for elections.
Autochthonous politicians started to explicitly agitate people to exclude
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Rwandan immigrants because such agitation promoted their popularity and
likelihood to win election. Violent clashes between Rwandan immigrants
and autochthonous groups increased. Examples include the Masisi War, a
series of clashes between Banyarwanda and Hunde-Nyanga militia in North
Kivu since May 1993, which resulted in death of more than 6,000 people [61].
In 1994, the Rwandan civil war since 1990 resulted in the Rwandan Geno-
cide, which generated a massive ow of Rwandan refugees to Eastern Congo.
The abrupt increase of Rwandan people exacerbated anti-Rwandan senti-
ment and harassment against Rwandophone people escalated. In response,
Rwandophone people started to organize armed resistance. The resistance
received a strong military support from the new Rwandan government that
was formed after the Rwandan Genocide and led by Paul Kagame. At the
time, Rwanda was suering from cross-border attacks of the former govern-
ment forces of Rwanda who ed to the DRC after they were defeated in the
Rwandan civil war. The continuation of the dysfunctional Mobutu regime
eectively provided shelter to the Rwandan insurgent groups. The Kagame
regime supported the armed resistance to oust Mobutu and eradicate the
former government elements in the DRC. The armed resistance grew into a
full-edged rebellion of the Alliances des Forces Democratiques pour la Lib-
eration du Congo-Zare (AFDL), which was formed in October 1996, when
the First Congo War began. With the military support by the Rwandan
government and the corruption of the Congolese national army, the rebel-
lion swiftly succeeded. In May 1997, L. D. Kabila, the leader of the AFDL,
ousted Mobutu and became the President.
At rst, the Kabila regime was under strong inuence of the Rwanda
government and Rwandophone Congolese. However, Kabila tried to remove
their inuence, for example dismissing the chief of sta of the new national
army, James Kabarebe, a Rwandan. As as result, the Rwandan govern-
ment, which sought to retain the inuence, became soured on Kabila. Then,
another rebel group, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD),
launched the Second Congo War, again with the help of Rwanda. This time,
with intervention of other African countries, the battle reached a stalemate.
With the mediation of the international community, belligerents signed the
Lusaka peace agreement in 1999, which prescribed the ceasere, the end of
intervention of the neighboring countries, and the PKO of the UN, Mission
de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en Republique democratique du Congo
(MONUC). However, actual peace was not achieved because most of signato-
ries, especially L. D. Kabila himself, were not willing to implement it. It was
after L. D. Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 that the peace process
started to work. His son, Joseph Kabila, who succeeded the presidency, was
more cooperative to the international community. With the mediation of the
UN and the African Union (AU), warring parties nally signed the Pretoria
peace agreement in December 2002. The agreement prescribed the end of
the civil war and the power sharing in the new government, giving important
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and lucrative positions in the cabinet and the army for leaders of both the
government and the rebel groups. As a result, the provisional government
was formed in 2003, and then the civil war was formally ended. Elections
were held and Kabila was elected as president again in 2006. However, the
new government was also weak and corrupt, failed to mediate ethnic tension
in Eastern Congo, and fell out with Rwanda. In short, few of the funda-
mental problems of the DRC, which the following sections discuss in detail,
were yet to be solved. As a natural consequence, violence has continued in
Eastern Congo (North and South Kivu, and Ituri) even after the elections
and the formation of the new government.
There are several reasons behind the selection of the DRC conicts as
the target case. The conicts have been well investigated by scholars, so a
large body of literature is available to understand the historical background,
the detail of the conict process, and purposes of conict actors [46{54]. It
also has gained a considerable attention from the international community
because of its scale and atrocity. One of the largest UN peace keeping oper-
ations, MONUSCO, is working for the case. Therefore, there are numerous
reports published by the United Nations and international NGOs, which
includes detailed information about armed groups active in Congo [55{87].
The amount of these reports is a crucial advantage of this case for the
database construction.
Additionally, the conict shares some typical characters of civil wars in
Africa in the 1990s. For example, its colonial period exacerbated ethnic
problems that nally triggered the civil war. Then, the rapid adoption
of multi-party democracy after the long period of dictatorship unleash the
ethnic tension. The weak government failed to resolve the ethic and local
disputes and the vicious cycle of violence, leading to the eruption of civil
war. Therefore, the investigation of the DRC conict is a good starting
point for understanding civil wars in Africa. In the following sections, these
features of the conict are discussed further in regional, national, and local
levels of analysis. The correspondence between several ssion-fusion events
mentioned in the following sections and the ssion-fusion data shown in
Table 4.1 is also indicated.
2.2 Regional levels
Regional politics in Central Africa played crucial roles in the conicts. In
pursuit of security and economic benet, neighboring couturiers intervened.
Among others, the involvement of Rwanda and Uganda was particular. They
were the principal supporters of the largest rebel group, the AFDL in the
First War and the RCD int the Second. Both governments beneted from
rich mineral resources in Eastern Congo, including coltan, cassiterite, and
gold.
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Moreover, Rwanda had a strong incentive for the intervention because
of a national security concern. After the 1994 genocide, the bulk of armed
forces and paramilitary of the former Hutu-dominated Rwandan government
ed the country and inltrate into the DRC as refugees, without being dis-
armed. Then, they launched a fresh assault against the new Tutsi-dominated
Rwandan government across the border. Kigali asked Kinshasa to disarm
them but the latter did not live up to expectations, which led the former's
direct involvement into the Wars. However, the Rwandan insurgent group,
now called Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), sus-
tained its presence in Eastern Congo, and the relation between Kinshasa
and Kigali kept swinging between cooperation and confrontation over the
disarmament of the group.
The rivalry between Rwanda and Uganda also exacerbated the conict,
playing a key role in the ssion-fusion of rebels. Though the two couturi-
ers collaborated in the support of the RCD at the outset of the Second
War in 1999, they broke up soon. Then, Uganda created a new insurgent
group in 1999, Mouvement de liberation du Congo (MLC), and the RCD
also split into the Uganda-supported faction, RCD-Kisangani/Mouvement
de Liberation (RCD-K/ML), and Rwanda-supported one, RCD-Goma, in
1999 (Data 22, 27, and 28). As as result, inter-rebel conicts over territorial
control rapidly increased, with the battle over Kisangani in August 1999 the
most notable example. Similarly, the rivalry complicated and exacerbated
the conict in Ituri province, where armed groups with the dierent sponsors
fought each other.
Therefore, the DRC conicts have aspects of proxy wars between the
Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC. However, the armed groups supported by
the government were not mere puppets, as they had their purpose and did
not always obey their sponsors. For example, though the Ugandan govern-
ment facilitated the integration of three Ugandan-supported armed groups,
MLC, RCD-K/ML, and RCD-National (RCD-N), into Front de liberation
du Congo (FLC) in 2001 but the FLC soon fragmented because of their
leadership dispute (Data 38 to 43). Armed groups sometime switches the
sponsors. The Union des patriotes congolais (UPC) splintered from the
Uganda-supported RCD-K/ML, continued to gain support from the govern-
ment at rst, but switched the sponsor from Kampala to its rival, Kigali
(Data 37). Though the conicts were surely internationalized, the agency
of the domestic armed actors were no negligible at all.
2.3 National levels
Characters of the DRC national government promoted the conicts. During
the long period of dictatorship by Mobutu, the economy and administration
collapsed and peripheral areas, including Eastern Congo, were out of the
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reach of the governance. The lack of functional security and judicial sectors
promoted the local conicts and frustration of people against the govern-
ment. Especially, in the 1990s, politicians facilitated local ethnic conicts to
gain popularity in their own ethnic community, which became more impor-
tant in introduction of multi-party democracy. The dissolved local conicts
triggered the civil wars and have kept playing crucial roles in insecurity in
Eastern Congo.
Moreover, under the Mobutu regime, the national army was intentionally
kept weak by Mobutu to reduce the risk of a coup. Servicemen were not
paid enough and engaged in illegal activities. People were exploited rather
than protected by the national army. The traditional malfunction and ill
discipline of the national army made it dicult for following presidents to
defeat the insurgent groups and prevent people from supporting them.
Because of its inability to resolve the conicts militarily, the government
frequently signed peace agreements with insurgent groups and integrated
them into the national army without complete destruction of their chain of
command. However, it was common that former insurgents got dissatised
by the treatment in the army and defected to organize a new rebellion. In
other words, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) re-
peatedly failed in the DRC. For example, RCD, the group that launched
the Second War, got integrated in the national army, Forces Armees de la
Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC), as the 2002 Pretoria Agree-
ment prescribed (Data 60). However, part of the former RCD members
defected to organize Congres national pour la defense du peuple (CNDP) in
2006 (Data 113). The CNDP was nally integrated into the FARDC in 2009
but part of its members defected again to launch a new rebellion, Mouve-
ment du 23-Mars (M23), in 2012 (Data 138 and 181). Former rebel leaders
in the army who rose up rebellion frequently signed a peace agreement with
the government and got a higher position or a more lucrative position in the
army. The impunity and promotion of the defectors made rebellion more
attractive for other dissatised members in the army.
This vicious cycle has been exacerbated by the lack of strong incentives
for the government to restore security in Eastern Congo. Since the end of
the Second War, most of armed groups were not serious threats to the gov-
ernment considering their military capacity, even though the people suered.
The political support base of current leaders in Kinshasa is Katanga, the
southern part the country, because of their ethnic ties. Moreover, the DRC
economy has largely depended on the revenue that Katanga generates in
machinery mining since the colonial period. It is also the important source
of the patronage network of the president. While Eastern Congo is also rich
in mineral resources, their production largely depends on artisanal mining
and the economic importance is smaller for the government. Without incen-
tives for fundamental conict resolution, an easy and cheap way of response
for insecurity has been the (repeated) supercial integration of insurgent
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groups into the national army.
2.4 Local levels
Eastern Congo was rife with local conicts between dierent ethnic commu-
nities over administrative/political power and land tenure. Exacerbated by
regional and national dynamics, they formed the basis of the DRC conict
Above all, the key conicts were between Banyarwanda and Hunde in North
Kivu, Banyamulenge and Bembe in South Kivu, and Lendu and Hema in
Ituri. Each community members supported and composed of the main part
of armed groups, which attacked civilians of rival communities.
The history of these conicts dates back to colonial period. The colo-
nial and post-colonial governments gave favor to one side, and their prefer-
ence sometimes changed to the other side of the rival communities. These
ethnicity-based, unfair, incoherent policies increased the tensions. Finally,
the regional and national instability in the 1990s allowed each conict to
turn into full-edged wars.
Event after the end of the Second War, these local confrontations con-
tinued. Disarmament of these local armed groups did not progress partly
because local people continued support them. The people trusted neither
the rival ethnic community nor the national army, and they needed to keep
the armed group who protected them from the assaults of the rival commu-
nity and the national army. Local politicians also kept their support for the
armed groups to gain popularity and win votes at elections.
On the one hand, armed groups that had strong ties to local communities
often provided security that the national army did not. On the other hand,
however, it was common that such groups started to use their military power
for their own sake sooner or later. They intervened local politics, gained
illegal prot, and harassed those who opposed the group. Therefore, the
emergence and presence of local armed groups has exacerbated rather than
solved the insecurity in Eastern Congo.

Chapter 3
Method
3.1 Data collection
3.1.1 Information sources
Information about ssion-fusion of armed groups was collected from various
secondary sources. They include academic literature and reports of the UN
and international NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, International Cri-
sis Group, Small Arms Survey, and Rift Valley Institute [55{87]. Reports
of the UN Group of Experts of the DRC and those of the Rift Valley In-
stitute (RVI) are particularly helpful to collect detailed information about
the armed groups. The Usalama Project of the RVI has examined armed
groups and their inuence on Congolese society with extensive led works,
and has published a series of reports, each of which focused on an armed
groups [60{73]. Therefore, the reports of the UN and the RVI compose the
main information sources in the data construction, while they are comple-
mented by various other sources mentioned above.
3.1.2 Data format
The unit of the data is a directed link from the group before a ssion-
fusion event (mother group) to the group after the event (daughter group).
For example, the genealogy in Fig. 3.1 is composed of six directed links.
Therefore, the corresponding data is composed of six units of data, which is
shown in Table 3.1.
Each unit of data also records when the event occurred (year, month,
day). How precisely the time of events is specied by the sources varies from
event to event. Therefor, the uncertainty of the time of the event is also
included in the data. If the date is fully specied (i.e. all of the year, month,
and day are specied) by the sources, the uncertainty is 0 and the specied
date (year, month, day) is recorded, as data 1 and 2 in Table 3.1. If the day
is not specied but the month and year are specied, the uncertainty is 1.
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Figure 3.1: An example of genealogical networks, which represents that
Group A split into B and C, then C split into D and E, nally B and E
merged into F.
Table 3.1: A example of data. This corresponds to the genealogy in Fig.
3.1.
ID year month day uncertainty mother daughter
1 2000 10 10 0 Group A Group B
2 2000 10 10 0 Group A Group C
3 2005 8 1 1 Group C Group D
4 2005 8 1 1 Group C Group E
5 2010 1 1 2 Group B Group F
6 2010 1 1 2 Group E Group F
The day is assumed to be 1st if no information helps further identication,
as data 3 and 4 in Table 3.1. If the month is not specied but the year
is specied, the uncertainty is 2. The month is assumed to be January if
no information helps further identication, as data 5 and 6 in Table 3.1. If
the year is not specied by the sources, the uncertainty is 3. The year is
conjectured from other indirect information.
Emergence and demise of armed groups are also included in the data.
To represent them, two exceptional nodes are introduced: source and drain.
Table 3.2 is a example. Emergence of an armed group is denoted as the
directed link from the source to the groups as data 1, while demise as the
link from the group that ceased to exist to drain as data 2.
Table 3.2: A example of data. Emergence of Group A and demise of Group
B.
ID year month day uncertainty mother daughter
1 1999 1 11 0 source Group A
2 2009 12 21 0 Group B drain
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3.1.3 Coding criteria
I read the reports thoroughly and coded ssion-fusion events of armed groups
into the data format explained above. Armed groups that experience the
events must be independent organizations that have an independent chain
of command. In other words, ssion-fusion of organizations that are subor-
dinated to others are excluded. For example, integration of two regiments
of the national army is not included in the data. Focal armed groups also
need to participate in either the Congo Wars (1996{2003) or Eastern Congo
conicts (2003{present). Armed groups that originated in foreign couturiers
are also included as long as they fought the conicts, with the FDLR the
most notable example.
Fission-fusion of armed groups are recorded in the data when their lead-
ership structure changed. This criterion is set because of importance and
feasibility. The behavior of armed groups are largely determined by leaders
and changes of leadership structure are frequently mentioned in the reports.
In contrast, the enrollment or defection of individual rank and le soldiers,
which are almost impossible to trace, are not included in the data. If an
armed groups experiences a change of leadership structure, then it is re-
garded another group even it keeps to hold the same name. For example,
when two groups, say A and B, merge into one group, the new group may be
given a new name, C, or takes over one of the two names, A or B. In either
case, both of the two original groups are regarded as changed because their
leadership structure are dierent between before and after the integration.
The timing of ssion-fusion is also based on the leadership changes, while
changes of the whole organization of armed groups often take some time.
For example, it is when leaders of the groups accepted the new integrated
leadership that is coded as the time of integration of dierent armed groups.
In many cases, such agreements are nally formalized in cease-re or peace
agreements, and therefore, the date in which they signed the agreement is
recorded as the date of integration. By the same token, it is when (part of)
the leaders get disobedient to the current leadership structure that is coded
as the time of splintering of armed group. In some cases, the disobedience
is announced through media, and in other cases it becomes public with the
eruption of inghting. These determined the time of splintering in the data.
Actually, integration of rank and le soldiers into the new troops may take
several months because of necessary redeployment and training, and proceed
gradually. Separation of troops into two or more groups also may takes long
time. However, it is almost impossible to trace the process of such gradual
changes with the available information sources. Therefore, the coding rule
is set as such.
As previously noted, a part of an armed group, say A, may splinter from
the group and immediately join another group, say B, without any activity
as an independent group. It is distinguished from the case that A splits
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into two groups in the rst event, say A and C, then in the next event C
joins B. Though the two cases are dicult to distinguish when the interval
between the two event in the later case is extremely short, such confusing
cases actually did not appear in the sources. This is probably because when
the interval is extremely short, e.g. several days, the authors of the sources
do not regard the armed groups' independent activity during the period.
Non-armed groups, such as political parties and self-help organizations,
play important roles in conicts. They sometimes nancially support armed
groups or help their recruitment of combatants by agitating young people.
However, ssion-fusion of armed groups and non-armed groups are out of
scope of this study. Therefore, when an armed group A, splinter into an
armed faction B and non-armed faction C, then only the change from A to
B is recorded in the data as a directed link from A to B, and the directed
link from A to C is excluded. The integration is also coded in the same way.
3.2 Network analysis
3.2.1 Genealogical networks
The information about which groups changed into which groups can be rep-
resented by a genealogical network, in which nodes represent groups and
links represent genealogical relations. Genealogical networks are hardly
studied in political science, let alone conict studies. However, they have
been intensively investigated in other elds. For example, genealogical net-
works of species, cells, pathogens, languages, individuals, and rms are
studied in biology [88{91], epidemiology [92{95], linguistics [96, 97], and
econo-/socio-physics [98,99], respectively. These works have shown that ge-
nealogical networks contain valuable information about the dynamics of the
system.
A notable example is the study of phylogenetic trees, which represent
genealogical relation of pathogens: which pathogens mutated into which
pathogens. The relation between the transmission dynamics and the shape
of phylogenetic trees of pathogens is a burgeoning area of research in epi-
demiology. Frost and Volz analyzed a mathematical model and showed that
a quantity, imbalance, is large, if the pathogen has a period in which its
infectiousness is high or if there are groups with high contact rate [93].
Similarly, Colijn and Gardy showed imbalance increases when the contact
network is a chain or has a hub [94]. Levanthal et al. analyzed empirical
phylogenetic trees of HIV virus sampled in Switzerland and found the high
imbalance, consistently with the theoretical results [92].
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Denitions
A genealogical network composed of a set of nodes V = fv1; v2; : : : ; vNg and
that of directed links E = fe1; e2; : : : ; eMg. A node represents a group and
an directed link represents the genealogical relation between a mother group
and a daughter group. When a group vi originates from another group vj ,
the network includes a directed link (vj ; vi) 2 E, and I call vi a daughter
node of vj and vj a mother node of vi.
Directed acyclic graphs
An importance property of genealogical networks is the absence of cycles:
If A originates from B, and B from C, then C does not originate from A.
More precisely, genealogical networks are directed acyclic graphs (DAGs),
which do not include any subset of nodes

vp(1); vp(2); : : : ; vp(l)
	
that satises 
vp(k); vp(k+1)
 2 E for k = 1; : : : ; l  1 and vp(1) = vp(l), with p an arbitrary
function.
A wide range of real networks are DAGs, in addition to genealogical
networks. A well-known example is citation networks [100{102]. Nodes rep-
resent documents, such as academic papers, patents, and judicial precedents,
and directed links represents which documents cite which documents. Cita-
tion networks are usually acyclic because documents can cite those published
before. Food webs [103], dominance hierarchy networks [104], and transcrip-
tional regulatory networks [106,107] are also suitably described by DAGs.
3.2.2 Network characteristics
Various quantities have been proposed to characterize the structure of net-
works; diameter, clustering coecients, degree distribution, centrality, hier-
archy, among others [108{110]. However, most of them are not designed to
characterize genealogical networks and their interpretations are not straight-
forward in application to genealogical networks. Two notable exceptions are
imbalance [111] and reversibility [112]. Therefore, this study focuses on the
two quantities, though more diverse characterization of genealogical net-
works remains to be proposed in future studies.
Imbalance
Imbalance is a quantity that was introduced to assess the level of asymmetry
of genealogical trees [111]. It has been used to infer the process by which
the trees have grown [113,114]. Especially, previous studies in epidemiology
and biology have shown that the quantity is one of the most suitable shape
character for the detection of various types of heterogeneity in the growing
process of genealogy [92{95,115,116].
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Figure 3.2: Graphs of (a) smaller imbalance and (b) larger imbalance,
adopted form [93].
Imbalance was originally dened only for genealogical trees, and I call it
tree imbalance for clarication. Tree imbalance is the average path length
from the maximal node to a minimal node. Minimal (maximal) nodes are
the nodes that do not have any daughter (mother) nodes, the set of which
are denoted by m (M). Note that a genealogical tree has only one maximal
node and the maximal node has an unique path to each minimal node. In
other words, tree imbalance is denoted by
Itree =
1
jmj
X
i2m
l ((i)) ; (3.1)
where (i) is the path from the maximal node to i and l() is the length of
.
A genealogical network, however, may have multiple maximal nodes and
a maximal node may have multiple paths to a minimal node. Therefore, I
dene imbalance of a network, which I call network imbalance, as
Inet =
1
jmj
X
i2m
l ((i)) ; (3.2)
(i) = arg max
(i)2(i)
l ((i)) ; (3.3)
where (i) is the set of all paths from node i to any maximal nodes. This
means that network imbalance is the average length of the longest path
from any maximal node to a minimal node. In the language of ssion-
fusion of armed groups, network imbalance is the average number of ssion-
fusion events that armed groups experienced before they died or reached
the end of the observation period. Dierent members of an armed group
experienced dierent numbers of events and the quantity focuses on those
who experienced the most frequent ssion-fusion.
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When the focal network is a tree, its network imbalance reduces to the
tree imbalance. Though other analogous denitions may be possible, as a
rst step to search for characteristics of genealogical networks that imply the
growing mechanism, current study adopts the denition. Note that isolated
nodes, if included, are of neither incoming nor outgoing links, therefore
they satisfy both of the denitions of maximal nodes and minimal nodes.
However, they are dened as maximal nodes to prevents their eect on
network imbalance.
A method to calculate network imbalance is to divide node into layers
by leaf-removal algorithm [107]. The layer of node i is denoted by Li 2
f0; 1; : : : g. First, the maximal nodes are are assigned to layer 0 (i.e., if
i 2 M then Li = 0), and the maximal nodes and links attached to them
are removed. Then, the maximal nodes in the reduced graph are assigned
to layer 1, and the nodes and attached links are removed. This procedure is
repeated until all the nodes are removed. Then, the layer of a node is equal
to the longest path length to maximal nodes, as
Li = l (
(i)) : (3.4)
The network imbalance is obtained by Eq. (3.2) and (3.4).
A proof of Eq. (3.4) is achieved by induction. When l ((i)) = 1, it
is trivial from the denition. Suppose the equation holds for l ((i))  k.
Consider a node i such that l ((i)) = k + 1. Suppose that k   1 steps of
node removal have been implemented and node j has any incoming links. A
node that gives node i the incoming link, say node j, must be assigned to
layer larger than k, i.e., Lj  k + 1. This means l ((j))  k + 1 because
if l ((j))  k then Eq. (3.2) hold by the current assumption. However,
this contradict l ((i)) = k + 1 because a longer path is obtained through
node j. Therefore, node j in step k does not have any incoming link and
Lj = k + 1.
Reversibility
Reversibility is a quantity that was recently proposed by Corominas-Murtra
et al. to assess complexity of DAGs, especially with genealogical networks
a typical target [112]. It is the average uncertainty of the process of going
back from non-maximal nodes to maximal nodes. Large reversibility means
that when one traces back from a non-maximal nodes to a maximal node
(i.e., an origin), there are various paths. A genealogy of armed groups with
larger reversibility implies that armed group on average have more diverse
members who have dierent and more complicated histories of ssion-fusion.
Let the set of paths from a non-maximal node i to any maximal nodes
be denoted by (i). In the process of going back to maximal nodes, we
suppose each mother node is chosen with the same probability. Then, the
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probability that a path k 2 (i) is chosen is,
P (kji) =
Y
j2(k)
1
dinj
; (3.5)
where (k) is the set of nodes participating in path k and d
in
j is the out-
degree of node j . Then reversibility of a non-maximal node i is dened
as
Hi =  
X
k2(i)
P (kji) lnP (kji): (3.6)
Reversibility of a network H is the average of the node reversibility,
H =
X
i2V nM
1
N   jM jHi; (3.7)
where N is the number of the nodes and M is the set of maximal nodes.
Figure 3.3: Graphs that are limits case in reversibility, adopted from [112].
Fig. 3.3 shows graphs that are limits case in reversibility [112]. Graph
(a) is a tree and all non-maximal nodes have the unique path to the max-
imal node. Therefore, the reversibility is zero. Graph (b) has six maximal
nodes and one non-maximal node. The non-maximal node has six paths to
maximal nodes. Therefore, the reversibility is ln 6. Graph (c) is the graph
that has the largest reversibility in graphs that has three maximal nodes
and three non-maximal nodes.
3.2.3 Network models
Comparison of network characteristics between empirical networks and ran-
domized networks is a basic method to evaluate the structure of networks
[108]. Randomized networks are most commonly generated by congura-
tion models, which conserve the degrees of nodes (degree sequence) and
randomizes the other information [117, 118]. Randomization methods that
have been proposed for DAGs are also extension of conguration models
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and conserve the directed degree sequence of DAGs [119{121]. However,
the conservation of degree sequence of genealogical networks does not seem
to have clear interpretations in the ssion-fusion dynamics. Moreover, the
conguration models may generate networks that does not make sense as a
genealogy.
Therefore, this study proposes a new randomization method for ge-
nealogical networks. It is analogous to Yule model, which is commonly used
in randomization of genealogical trees [122]. In the model, a tree grows as
minimal nodes of the current tree branches with the same probability. Then,
this model can randomize empirical genealogical trees with the number of
splitting events conserved. The corresponding hypothesis for ssion-fusion
of armed groups is clear: each existing groups splits into two groups with the
same probability. However, ssion-fusion dynamics of armed groups contain
more complex patterns of events. Armed groups not only split and but also
merge. Moreover, splintering and merger may occur at the same time, as
a part of a group defects from the group to join another. Therefore, this
study propose a randomization method that conserves the number of each
types of events, instead of the number of branching.
Decomposition
To implement the randomization, a genealogical network is decomposed into
ssion-fusion events. If two links share the same mother node or the same
daughter node, then the two links belong to the same event. More precisely,
a event is a set of links. Let the event that a link e belongs to be denoted by
"(e), and the mother and daughter nodes of e by vs(e) and vt(e), respectively.
Then, "(e) = "(e0) if vs(e) = vs(e0) or vt(e) = vt(e0). Fig. 3.4 illustrates
the decomposition. The genealogy in Fig. 3.4 is the same with Fig.3.1 and
Table 3.1. It is decomposed into three events (a), (b), and (c).
Figure 3.4: Illustration of decomposition of a genealogical network into
events (a), (b), and (c).
As previously noted, birth and death of armed groups are represented
by links between the groups and exceptional nodes, source and drain. These
links are neglected in measurement of network characteristics because the
source and drain are ctional. However, they are not neglected in the de-
composition process to correctly count the birth and death events of armed
groups. Nodes that existed before any events are called initial nodes. In
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other words, initial nodes are maximal nodes in the networks that contain
the exceptional links.
Composition
Events are randomly composed to generate a genealogical network. First,
the order of event are randomly determined so that the number of existing
groups do not become negative during the growing process of the genealogy.
Suppose the number of events is T and a sequence of event ("1; "2; : : : ; "T )
is drawn from the uniform distribution over all possible ordering. Let the
number of dierent mother nodes in " be denoted by ns("), that of daughter
nodes by nt("), and the number of initial nodes by ninit. In event ", n
s(")
existing groups evolve into nt(") new groups. Then if
ninit  
X
t=1
ns("t) +
 1X
t=1
nt("t)  0 (3.8)
holds for   T , then the number of existing groups is always non-negative.
If the condition is satised, the drawn sequence is adopted as the order of
events, otherwise another sequence is drawn.
Second, the groups that participate in each event are determined. In
each step t = 1; 2; : : : ; T , ns("t) nodes are chosen as mother nodes, n
t("t)
nodes are added as daughter nodes, and links contained in "t are wired
between them. Only groups that exist (i.e., have not split, merged, or died)
at the step can participate in the event of the step. Therefore, mother
nodes are chosen from the minimal nodes in the current graph (that does
not neglect links to drain). As analogous to Yule model, each existing node
has the same probability to participate in the event. Fig. 3.5 illustrates
this random composition, with events (a), (b), (c) and one initial node. The
order of events of the randomized network is (b), (c), and (a).
Figure 3.5: Illustration of random composition of events (a), (b), and (c)
with one initial node.
Chapter 4
Result
4.1 Data and basic properties
Table 4.1 is the data of ssion-fusion of armed groups in the DRC since
1996. It is composed of 204 data units. The details and references of each
unit are in Appendix.
The genealogical network constructed based on the data includes 162
nodes and 186 links. Fig. 4.1 shows the largest connected component of
the genealogical network, which contains 153 nodes and 184 links. It was
visualized by Cytoscape 3.4.0 [123]. The label of a node shows the name
of the group and the time of the event that generated the group. The
vertical positions are arranged according to the order of the events by which
the groups were created. If group A was created by a ssion-fusion event
earlier than group B, then A is in a higher position than B. The horizontal
positions were arranged so that nodes representing the groups that have the
same name have similar horizontal positions.
Fig. 4.2 shows the time development of the number of armed groups.
The number steadily increased during the Wars (1996-2003), and did not
decrease even after 2003, when the Second War ended. It rapidly increased
since 2012. This indicates the insecurity in Eastern Congo since 2012, which
was largely caused by the rebellion of the insurgent group M23 since 2012.
Most of the groups that participated in the events since 2012 were pointed
out to be related with the M23 or its supporter Rwanda (Appendix, Data
160{204).
Figure 4.3 shows the out- and in-degree distributions of the network.
The distributions are both narrow and most of nodes have degree from zero
to three. There is no node that has a huge number of incoming or outgoing
links. In other words, fragmentation into a large number of groups or merger
of such many groups were hardly observed.
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Figure 4.1: The largest connected component of the genealogical network of
the armed groups.
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4.2 Comparison with randomized networks
Fig.4.4 shows the imbalance and the reversibility of the empirical network
and randomized networks. The values for randomized networks are averaged
over 1,000 samples. It shows that both of the imbalance and the reversibility
of the empirical data are signicantly larger than those of random networks.
This result shows the existence of non-random structure in the ssion-fusion
network, answering the key question of this research. In the language of
ssion-fusion of armed groups, actual armed groups on average experienced
more ssion-fusion events until they died or reached the end of the obser-
vation period, and their members had more diverse and complex histories,
than expected from the process in which every existing groups split and/or
merge with the same probability.
Figure 4.4: Comparison of (a) imbalance and (b) reversibility between the
empirical network and randomized networks. The values for randomized
networks are averaged over 1,000 samples. The error bars shows the standard
deviation.
4.3 Pivotal group model
4.3.1 Denition
Motivation
The next question is how to explain the non-random structure of the net-
work. A possibility is heterogeneity in probability to participate in ssion-
fusion event. This is because, rst, the heterogeneity of branching proba-
bility in the growth of genealogical trees is known to increase tree imbal-
ance [92{95], therefore similar heterogeneity is expected to increase network
imbalance. Second, the heterogeneity also ts the reality of the Congolese
conicts. As explained Sec. 2.3, the DRC government repeated supercial
integration of insurgent groups to pretend a responsible government under
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the international pressure. The government was unwilling to tackle fun-
damental grievance in Eastern Congo, was not strong enough to defeat the
insurgent groups, but needed to pretend doing something for the conict res-
olution according to the norm of the international community [69]. Other
armed groups usually do not have similar incentives to oer high positions
of their groups and temporally integrate others. To reect this reality, the
random network model is extended to allow existing groups have dierent
tendencies to participate in ssion-fusion events and the tendencies are in-
herited to succeeding groups. We call this extended model the pivotal group
model, which is explained in detail below. Though there can be other mod-
els to reect the uniqueness of the national army, this model is one of the
simplest models that the author conceives of.
Node selection
As the previous random model, the pivotal group model also decompose
genealogical networks into ssion-fusion events and uniformly randomize
the order of events, . In the composition process of the random model,
however, each existing groups have the same probability of participation.
In other words, minimal nodes (i.e., existing groups) may have dierent
probability to be mother nodes of a focal event. Specically, each node is
supposed to have its weight and is chosen to be a mother node according
to its relative weight. Let the set of minimal nodes at step t of composition
be denoted by m(t) = fv1; v2; : : : ; vn(t)g. Suppose that each node v has the
weight w(v) > 0. We choose ns("t) nodes from m(t) to be mother nodes
of event "t. When we have nished choosing k nodes, the set of chosen
node is denoted by ~m(t; k). The nodes that have been already chosen to
mother nodes are not chosen again. Then, in the choice of the k th node,
the probability that node v 2 m(t)n ~m(t; k) is chosen is,
w(v)P
v02m(t)n ~m(t;k)w(v0)
: (4.1)
An exception is that when the event is the demise of an existing group (i.e.
when the number of daughter nodes of an event is equal to zero) all existing
nodes have the same probability to die (i.e., to be the mother node). This
exceptional treatment is introduced to reect the situation of the Congolese
conicts. Though armed groups frequently defected from and joined into the
national army, the national army's demise was hardly observed. Another
exceptional case is the birth of a group, in which we do not need to choose
any mother node, and just adding another existing node is enough.
The pivot and its inheritance
This pivotal group model assumes that (1) there is a group that is more
likely to participate in events, which we call the pivotal group, while the
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other groups have the same probability of participation and (2) one of the
daughter groups of the pivotal group is to be the next pivotal group, which
has the same weight with the current pivotal group. Therefore, when v
represents the current pivotal group, w(v) = w  1, otherwise w(v) = 1.
The weight w is called the pivot weight. The daughter node to become
the next pivotal group is chosen from all the daughter nodes of the current
pivotal node with the same probability. If the pivotal node dies, then no
node is pivotal and every existing node has the weight w(v) = 1. Note if a
group participates in a ssion-fusion event, the group itself ceases to exist
because it evolves into dierent groups. Therefore, even a pivotal group
participates in only one ssion-fusion event.
4.3.2 Two limit cases
To test the eects of the weight heterogeneity, we check the behavior of the
model in limit cases: w = 1 (symmetric limit) and w = 1 (asymmetric
limit). In asymmetric limit, the pivotal group always participate in any
ssion fusion events except for the death of the group. For simplication,
events are randomly chosen from split of one group into two group or merger
of two groups into one group, the former with probability p = 3=4 and the
later with 1   p = 1=4. Splintering is set to be more likely than merger
because we are interested in the behavior of the model in which the number
of existing groups increases, as the Congolese conicts. No event of birth
and death of armed groups is included. Sequences of events must satisfy Eq.
(3.8), otherwise they are rejected and another sequence is randomly gener-
ated. Then, events are composed according to node weights as described
above.
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Figure 4.5: The dependence of the average imbalance (left) and reversibility
(right) on the number of events of the symmetric limit (red solid lines) and
the asymmetric limit (green broken lines). Averages are taken over 100
samples. Error bars represent the standard deviation.
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Figure 4.5 shows the dependence of the average imbalance of reversibility
on the number of events in the two limits. The imbalance in the asymmetry
limit more rapidly increases than that of the symmetry model as the num-
ber of the event increases. The reversibility is also larger in the asymmetry
limit than the symmetry limit. However, the dierence of reversibility be-
tween the two limits does not increase as rapid as that of imbalance when
the number of the event increases. This dierence between the symmetric
and asymmetric limits is consistent with the dierence between the empir-
ical network and randomized network, as the empirical network has larger
imbalance and reversibility than randomized networks and the asymmetric
limit does than the symmetric. This result of the preliminary tests im-
plies that the pivotal group model is better to explain the structure of the
genealogy of the Congolese armed groups than the randomization model.
4.3.3 Weight dependence
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Figure 4.6: The dependence of imbalance (left) and reversibility (right) on
pivot weight (green broken lines). The broken lines show the average of 1,000
randomly generated networks, and the error bars represent the standard
deviation. The red solid lines show the values of the empirical network.
Next, we check the performance of the model with the empirical set of
the events, which are obtained by decomposition of the genealogy of the
Congolese armed group. Fig. 4.6 shows the dependence of imbalance and
reversibility on the pivot weight. Both imbalance and reversibility increase
as the pivot weight increases. In consistent with the two limit cases, the
existence of the pivotal group of appropriate weight results in network char-
acteristics that are closer to empirical values. The empirical imbalance is
within one standard deviation from the average of values from the model in
a wide range of pivot weight, about 10  w  100. On the other hand,
the empirical reversibility does not get within the one standard deviation
even when the pivot weight is as large as w = 100, though the expectation
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from the model gets much closer to the empirical value than the complete
randomization.
4.3.4 Comparison with the national army
As previously noted, the candidate of the pivotal group in the contest of
the Congolese conicts is the national army. Therefore, we compare the
number of events that the pivotal node participate in the model and the
corresponding empirical value of the national army. It helps us to know how
well the model can explain the network characteristics when we assume the
national army play the role of the pivot.
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Figure 4.7: The dependence on the pivot weight of the number of events that
pivotal nodes participate in the pivotal model (the green broken line) and the
number of events that the national army participated in the empirical data
(the red solid line). The broken lines show the average of 1,0000 randomly
generated networks, and the error bars represent the standard deviation.
Fig. 4.7 compare theoretical expectation of the number of event that the
pivot participates in and the empirical number of events that the national
army participated in. The former is obtained from the simulation of the
pivotal model. It shows that the empirical value for the national army is
best expected when w is around 10. Therefore, when we suppose w is
between 10 to 20 and the national army plays the role of the pivot, the ex-
pectation of the model is consistent with the empirical network in imbalance
and the participation frequency of the pivot. Though the empirical value
of reversibility is not correctly expected when w is about 10 to 20, the ex-
pected value is much closer to the empirical value than that of the original
randomization model (i.e., when w = 1). These results are consistent with
the claim that the national army is the main protagonist of ssion-fusion
dynamics, as previous studies of the Congolese conicts points out [69].
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At the same time, the result implies that additional modications of the
model are required to precisely explain the empirical reversibility. In other
words, it is implied that there are additional factors in the ssion-fusion
dynamics other than the pivotal role of the national army. A possibility
is that a group of a more complex origin is more likely to participate in
ssion-fusion events. A group of a complex origin may have complex internal
structure, therefore it may tend to suer internal struggles. Such a group
may has diverse members, therefore it may be less reluctant to merge with
other groups. A way to combine this factor into the model is making the
node weight dependent on the node reversibility (Eq. (3.6)). Though it is
conjectured that this mechanism makes networks locally more complex and
enhances the reversibility, the investigation of the eects of this and other
extensions remain to be done in future studies.
4.4 Summary of the results
This study collected the data of ssion-fusion of the armed groups in the
Congolese conicts. The genealogical network of Congolese armed groups
has larger imbalance and reversibility than those expected when every exist-
ing groups split and/or merge with the same probability. In other words, the
Congolese armed groups on average experienced more ssion-fusion events
until they died or reached the end of the observation period, and their mem-
bers had more diverse and complex histories than expected from the random
process with the homogeneous ssion-fusion probability.
The characters of the genealogical network are better explained when we
assume that the national army is 10{20 times more likely to split and/or
merge than a non-state armed group. A possible reason of this heterogeneity
is that the government army, to deect the international pressure, uniquely
has an incentive to supercially integrate other armed groups even when the
integration would nally collapse. This implies that that conict resolution
in the DRC should be modied; The government should address the political
grievance of people in Eastern Congo instead of relying on cheap methods
of army integration. It also provides a lesson that the international com-
munity should more closely monitor the implementation process of peace
agreements or army integration, instead of being satised with supercial
conict-resolution.
Chapter 5
Discussion
5.1 Contributions of the present study
There are two key contributions of my research. The rst contribution
is that I found that a genealogical data of armed groups actually tells us
possible ssion-fusion mechanisms. The genealogy of the Congolese armed
groups obtained in this research suggests that the national army is more
likely to split and/or merge than a non-state armed group, rejecting the
assumption that every group has the same tendency of ssion-fusion. The
data also implies that there are some mechanisms of ssion-fusion that made
the genealogy so complex that it cannot be explained by the uniqueness of
the national army alone. It was not trivial that a genealogical network
of armed groups can be this informative. Therefore, this study not only
corroborates the understanding of the DRC conicts but also provides a
starting point for the collection and analysis of genealogical data of armed
groups in a wider range of civil wars, which was the principal aims of the
current research as discussed in Sec. 1.5.
Concerning the rst contribution, however, there are two notable points
that are beyond the reach of this study. The rst limitation is, as noted
in Sec. 1.5, that this study alone cannot tell us whether the ssion-fusion
in other conicts shares similar characters with that in the DRC conicts.
Though civil wars are dierent to each other in various dimensions, conict
studies have pointed out that they have part of the structure in common [6{8,
53]. Therefore, it is not so unreasonable to expect some common characters
of ssion-fusion dynamics of armed groups across dierent conicts. To
answer the question precisely, however, we need to expand the date to cover
a enough number of conicts.
The second limitation is that ssion-fusion of armed groups is not ev-
erything of civil war. Important phenomena related civil war include bat-
tles between armed groups, atrocities committed against civilians, cease-re
negotiations, and the implementation of peace agreements, among others.
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Data and analysis of ssion-fusion of armed groups alone do not directly tell
us these aspects and how the ssion-fusion dynamics interacts with these di-
mensions, as this study cannot. However, existing studies imply that ssion-
fusion of armed groups is strongly related with them. The ssion-fusion may
prolong civil war because they balance the power of warring parties [20],
change the likelihood of sexual violence by producing indisciplined splinter-
ing factions [10], hinder peace agreements and their implementation because
incessant changes of armed groups make their condence-building more dif-
cult [23, 28]. Though these connections have not been understood clearly,
detailed data of ssion-fusion of armed groups, including that of this study,
will help us to investigate them more soundly when future studies combined
them with data on other dimensions.
The second contribution is that I developed a new quantitative approach
to social dynamics: the genealogical network analysis. While many so-
cial phenomena are recently studied with quantitative and computational
methods, genealogical networks of social groups have hardly been analyzed.
Therefore, this study opened a new eld that various computational meth-
ods, especially those of network science, can be applied. However, as dis-
cussed in this study, most of network analysis methods are originally not
designed to study genealogical networks and therefore need to be modied
or extended. To nd appropriate methods for genealogical networks, it may
be useful to extend the methods of genealogical tree analysis to those of the
corresponding networks analysis, as this study did tree imbalance to net-
work imbalance. Another way is using the methods of DAG analysis that
are designed to study genealogical networks. Reversibility in the case. Nev-
ertheless, such methods are still very limited, and the expansion is a task of
future studies.
Genealogical network analysis of social groups can be applied to various
social phenomena. Fission-fusion is observed in a wide range of social groups:
social movements, rms, NGOs, sovereign states, administrative organiza-
tions of a government, peer groups in schools, musicians, hunter-gatherers,
to name a few. Each of them is an important subject in each eld of study:
sociology, economics, political science, educational research, anthropology,
etc. While this study focused on a specic armed conict in Africa, African
studies also have other topics of studies that analysis of genealogy can be ap-
plied to meaningfully. For example, many African states experiences rapid
introduction of multi-party democracy and the collapse of government since
1990s. The evolution of political and military organizations, ranging form
ruling political parties to anti-government civil movements, in the process
of these rapid and chaotic changes was extremely complicated. Collection
of the ssion-fusion data and analysis of the genealogy may help description
and understanding of the shifts between autocracy, democracy, and collapse
during the period.
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5.2 Future problems
It is strongly desired that future studies construct a more comprehensive
database that covers a wider range of cases, for deeper understanding of
ssion-fusion dynamics, especially the causes and eects of genealogical net-
work characteristics. Therefore, it is valuable to discuss room for improve-
ment in data collection procedure for the expansion of data.
Above all, ecient data collection is necessary to construct the compre-
hensive dataset, because it is extremely time-consuming and it takes several
years without any improvement of the procedure. For the purpose, details
of coding process should be recorded in a data (coding process data), sep-
arately from the data that is nally published or analyzed (output data).
For example, the coding process data should records (1) parts of documents
that have been already checked, (2) parts that are irrelevant for the purpose
of the dataset, (3) parts that are included in the output data and the rea-
son of the judgment of inclusion, and (4) parts that are excluded from the
output data and the reason of the judgment of exclusion. The rst element
is useful for the management of the coding. The second to fourth elements
are important for ecient verication, correction, and review of the data.
The information about what is excluded from the output data is espe-
cially important. The current procedure does not record excluded events,
which do not satisfy the criteria and therefore are not regarded as a ssion-
fusion event. This is problematic when the criteria are modied during the
coding process, because the coder must read again all the documents to
include the events that satisfy the new criteria. It is obvious that the modi-
cation of the criteria during the coding itself should be avoided. However,
the behaviour of armed groups has a tremendously wide variety. Therefore,
it is almost inevitable that unexpected cases require some modication of
criterion.
Another candidate of modication is the introduction of event categories.
The categories of ssion-fusion events may include, for example, splinter-
ing, independence, mutiny, coup, peace agreement, subordination, and side-
switching. Though there are many cases that are dicult to categorize, this
rough categorization would allow coders to remember and users to under-
stand more easily why the events are included in the data. In other words,
the categorization may not help the data analysis but it will allow for more
ecient verication or correction of the data, as the coding process data
will.
Though the necessary coverage of datasets to lead a signicant result is
dicult to estimate, a reasonable goal is to contain the armed conicts that
common datasets (e.g. the UCDP [42]) include, which is usually more than
100 cases. At the same time, however, the addition of only several cases
may allow for a valuable comparison. For example, the Liberian civil wars
(1989{1996 and 1999{2003) are an interesting case for the comparison with
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the DRC's because they are known as to have seen complicated changes of
warring parties but the country established a functioning and stable democ-
racy after the conicts in contrast with the DRC where the authoritarian
regime has kept eectively dominating the national politics. It is not clear
how much time and how large a budget are required when a project expands
the data because I have not recorded the time taken for the coding of the
current data though I should have. Moreover, the time required for the
coding would be largely dierent from coder to coder. Therefore pilot ex-
periments are necessary regardless of whether the project employs research
assistants or the principal investigators code the data by themselves.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Civil war is one of the most serious risks for human security today. To
understand the dynamics of civil war precisely, it is necessary to under-
stand the armed groups who ght the conict. A characteristic phenomena
concerning armed groups in civil conict is that they repeatedly split and
merge during the course of the war. Despite the importance of the ssion-
fusion dynamics on the conict resolution and prevention, pertinent data
with enough resolution for the analysis of genealogical network structure
were not available.
Therefore, I constructed a data on when, which armed groups split/merge
into which group during the course of conicts the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) since 1996. Necessary information was collected form various
secondary sources. The obtained genealogical network was found to have
larger imbalance and reversibility than randomized networks. This means
that the Congolese armed groups on average experienced more ssion-fusion
events until they died or reached the end of the observation period, and
their members had more diverse and complex histories, than expected from
the process in which every existing groups split and/or merge with the same
probability.
A possible explanation is that the national army plays the pivotal role
in the ssion-fusion of armed groups in the DRC because it temporally
integrates other armed groups to deect the international pressure. This
interpretation is consistent with the observation that the supercial conict
resolution by the government resulted in the repeated failure of army inte-
gration and continued insecurity in Eastern Congo and support the claim
that the DRC government should address the political grievance of people
in Eastern Congo and disarm the insurgent groups, instead of relying on
cheap methods of army integration.
This study elucidates the feasibility and value of genealogical data of
armed groups, which has signicant implications for various elds including
conict studies, African studies, and network science. Possible improve-
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ments of the data collection methods were also discussed with the extension
of the data to cover a wide range of cases in mind.
Appendix A
Details of the ssion-fusion
data
In this appendix, the details of the ssion-fusion data are explained. The
data units that compose the same ssion-fusion event are explained together.
Several events are also explained together when they are related and it is
better to explain them together.
Data 1
An armed group, Mai-Mai, emerged in response to the AFDL oensive.
According to Ref. [72],
In reaction to the AFDL oensive, youths mobilized in the Ruzizi
Plain to stop the advance of what was perceived to be a foreign
occupation force. They were supported by customary chiefs and
former Mulelist combatants, who arranged for healers or seers to
immunize them against bullets, using potions and rituals with
water (mai) similar to those the Simba rebels had used. There-
after these groups came to be known as Mai-Mai.
Though the year of establishment is not clearly mentioned, the AFDL of-
fensive started in 1996, therefore the year of the event is coded as 1996 and
the uncertainty is coded as 3.
Data 2, 3, 4, 5
Four insurgent groups (PRP, CNRD, ADP, and MRLZ) merged into a new
insurgent group AFDL on 18 October 1996, aiming to topple the Mobutu
regime was formed with the support of Rwanda. According to Ref. [47]:
The AFDL was created on 18 October 1996 at Lemera in South
Kivu at Lemera in South Kivu, nearly two months after the be-
ginning of the oensive from Rwanda. It was a coalition of four
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groups: Kabila's own PRP, which was now reduced to a few exiles
in Europe and America; the Conseil national de resistance pour
la deemocratie (CNRD), a small Lumumbist guerrilla group es-
tablished in 1993 in eastern Congo by Andre Kisase Ngandu;
the Alliance democratique des peuples (ADP), a grouping of
Congolese Tutsi led by Deogratis Bugera; and the Mouvement
revolutionnaire pour la liberation du Zare (MRLZ), and opposi-
tion group centred around the Bashi of South Kivu led by Anse-
leme Masasu Nindaga.
Data 6, 7
Two armed groups, ALIR/PALIR and ALIR-2, were formed by Rwandan
refugees in 1997. The ALIR/PALIR was created by ex-FAR commanders in
1997. According to Ref. [56]:
In 1997, an estimated 5,000 ex-FAR and Interahamwe rebels who
had dispersed in North Kivu regrouped to create the Armee de
Liberation du Rwanda (Rwanda Liberation Army, ALIR) and
its political branch, the Peuple en Action pour la Liberation du
Rwanda (People in Action for the Liberation of Rwanda, PALIR)
(Omaar, 2008, pp. 40{41). Meanwhile, Rwandan Hutus who
had ed to the western DRC, but also to Angola, the Central
African Republic, the Republic of the Congo, and Sudan, formed
ALIR-2.
Data 8
The AFDL defeated the army of the Mobutu regime and become the national
army of the DRC, which we call AFDL/FAC. It was May 1997 when the
AFDL ousted Mobutu, but when the AFDL became the national army is
not clearly written in sources. Therefore, the uncertainty is coded as 3. It
is natural to suppose the AFDL absorbed some other elements and there
were some leadership changes. However, which elements it absorbed are also
not clearly written in sources, therefore the event is coded as a change form
AFDL to AFDL/FAC.
Data 9, 10, 11
A part of an armed group les Combattans Hutu defected to join the AFDL/FAC
in 1997. According to Ref. [62],
In May 1997, the First Congo War ended with the AFDL's ar-
rival in Kinshasa. Laurent Kabila was declared the new presi-
dent and Zaire became the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
By September the same year, those involved in the continuing
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conict in North Kivu were seeking a strategic shift. The Rwan-
dan government began reaching out to co-opt Hutu leaders, some
of whom responded positively, persuading thousands of combat-
tants to join the AFDL. Among them was Robert Seninga, vice-
president of the combattants.
The month of side-switching is not found in the text, therefore the uncer-
tainty is coded as 2. The month is coded as September, the latest possible
month that is consistent with the text.
Data 12
The armed group les Combattans Hutu changed into Mongol. According to
Ref. [62],
By early 1998, those who resisted the call to join the AFDL
radicalized their resistance, basing themselves in southern Masisi
under the command of Bigembe Turinkinko and Hassan Mugabo.
This group called itself `Mongol'{according to some, a derivation
of the Kinyarwanda expression kumongore (`to choose a piece')
and a reference to the militia's practice of taxing and looting in
relative moderation.
Though in the radicalization of the group les Combattans Hutu to Mongol,
some elements are expected to have joined or defected, they are not written
in sources. Therefore, the event is coded as the change from les Combattans
Hutu to Mongol. The year of change is not found in the text, therefore the
uncertainty is coded as 3. The year is coded as 1998 because it should later
than the side-switching of part of les Combattans Hutu to AFDL/FAC.
Data 13, 14, 15, 16
A group led by Eric Ruhorimbere, Venant Bisogo and Mukalay Mushondo
defected from the national army but was forced to rejoin to the army soon
after the mutiny. According to Ref. [66],
Another persistent source of friction was the marginal status of
the Banyamulenge within the newly formed Congolese armed
forces. Conned to the lower ranks within the Rwandan army
and serving under Rwandan superiors during the AFDL insur-
gency, they now aspired to more inuential positions. Tensions
came to a head in February 1998: following reports that the Chief
of Sta of the Congolese armed forces, Rwandan Colonel James
Kabarebe, had given orders to deploy Banyamulenge ocers out-
side the Kivus, a number of troops mutinied in Bukavu. Led by
Eric Ruhorimbere, Venant Bisogo and Mukalay Mushondo, the
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mutineers could only be persuaded to reintegrate through the
personal intervention of Colonel Kabarebe.
The day of mutiny and the year of reintegration are not found in the text,
therefore the uncertainty is coded as 1 and 3, respectively. The later is coded
to be immediately after the former.
Data 17, 18, 19
A group led by Richard Tawimbi and Michel `Makanika' Rukunda, defected
from the national army but was captured soon after the mutiny. According
to Ref. [66],
The February 1998 mutiny was the rst in a series of incidents.
The following month, a group of around 30 Banyamulenge desert-
ers attacked the Rwandan army in Bukavu, an incident allegedly
motivated by the mistreatment of Banyamulenge soldiers. Many
of these dissidents, who were led by Richard Tawimbi and Michel
`Makanika' Rukunda, were captured; some were sentenced to
death.
The reintegration of the mutineers is not implied by the text and other
sources, therefore the group was coded to be eliminated rather that forced
to be integrated the army. The day of mutiny and the year of demise are not
found in the text, therefore the uncertainty is coded as 1 and 3, respectively.
Demise of the group is conjectured to be in the same month.
Data 20, 21
The RCD was formed on 16 August 1998 to launch a new rebellion to the
Kabila regime. The RCD was formed by former members of the national
army, which were deployed in Eastern Congo. Therefore, it is coded as the
splintering of the AFDL/FAC. After the event, the national army is simply
called the FAC. This event is mentioned in various sources: for example,
\RCD-Goma announced its leadership on 16 August 1998" in Ref. [55]. Note
that RCD-Goma is the name with which the current RCD was mentioned
with later.
Data 22
An insurgent group MLC was formed in mid-November 1998. Ref. [51]
says: \In mid-November, a new rebellion started in the northern Equateur
province, which it largely occupied after defeating the FAC and their Cha-
dian allies who suered heavy losses."
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Data 23, 24, 25, 26
A group led by Pacique Masunzu defected the army and rejoined later.
Ref. [66] says:
In early 1999, the RPA commander of Uvira, Colonel Dan Gap-
zi, ordered his arrest, but Masunzu was able to escape with the
help of fellow Banyamulenge soldiers, eeing to Bijombo in the
Hauts Plateaux. In an eort to subdue this mutiny, the RCD
reintegrated Masunzu back into its ranks, leaving him in the
highlands as a deputy battalion commander.
The month of mutiny and the year of reintegration are not found in the
text, therefore the uncertainty is coded as 2 and 3, respectively. The later
is conjectured to be in the same month with the former.
Data 27, 28
A group led byWamba dia Wamba, a leader of the RCD at the time, defected
from the group to form a splinter group RCD-K/ML in May 1999. The
mainstream faction of the RCD was called RCD-Goma (RCD-G) after the
splintering. This event is explained by many sources: for example, Ref. [51]
explains the behavior of Wamba dia Wamba as, \in March 1999, he set up
headquarters in Kisangani."
Data 29
ALIR-2 changed to ALIR-2/FDLR in 2000. Ref. [56] says \Its political
branch{the FDLR{was created in 2000 out of the Kinshasa-based Comite
de Coordination de la Resistance (Coordination Committee for Resistance)."
Though the group integrated another organization and the leadership changed,
the Coordination Committee for Resistance is not pointed out to be an
armed groups in sources, the event is coded as the change of ALIR-2 to
ALIR-2/FDLR.
Data 30, 31
A group led by Roger Lumbala defected from the RCD-K/ML to form RCD-
National (RCD-N) in January 2000. Lumbala was sent by Wamba, the
leader of RCD-K/ML to regain control of Bafwasende in January 2000,
where he created his own movement [50].
Data 32, 33, 34, 35
A group of Hema commanders defected form the RCD-K/ML to form the
CMF in 2000. The group nally surrendered to be absorbed into the MLC's
armed wing. Ref [63] says,
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In July, Hema APC commanders launched a mutiny in protest
against what they perceived as a pro-Lendu stance by Wamba,
calling themselves the Chui (`Leopard') Mobile Force (CMF).
[...]. Accompanied by a group of high-ranking Ugandan ocials,
the delegation travelled back to Bunia to negotiate the CMF's
peaceful surrender; in return, the Ugandans agreed to provide
military training to the mutineers. [...]. Following their training
in Kyankwanzi (for new recruits) and Jinja (for ocers), most
of them had been sent to Equateur Province to join the MLC's
armed wing. After some months of ghting for Bemba, the sol-
diers had grown increasingly frustrated. They knew that fellow
Hema were still dying in Ituri's inter-ethnic clashes, and they
felt that the MLC used them `like dogs'.
The day of splintering and the year of integration are not found in the text,
therefore the uncertainty is coded as 1 and 3 respectively. The later event is
conjectured to be before the UPC's creation (Data 36, 37) because otherwise
it seems natural for them to join the UPC rather than the MLC, therefore
it is coded to be in August in 2000.
Data 36, 37
A group led by Thomas Lubanga defected form the RCD-K/ML on 15
September 2000 to form the UPC. Ref. [63] describe the role of Lubanga
is the creation of the UPC as, \he assembled a group of educated Iturians,
many but not all of whom were Hema. On 15 September 2000, they created
the UPC and named Lubanga as president."
Data 38 to 43
The MLC, RCD-K/ML, and RCD-N formed the FLC in January 2001 but
splintered into the original groups in the same year. Ref. [63] says about it
formation,
Exasperated by the constant inghting in Ituri|for which its
own army was largely responsible|the Ugandan government in-
vited all three of the Congolese rebel groups that it supported to
talks in Kampala at the end of 2000: Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC,
the RCD-K/ML, and Roger Lumbala's RCD-National (RCD-
N). The result of these deliberations was the merger of all three
groups under the banner of the short-lived Front de liberation
du Congo (FLC, Front for the Liberation of Congo) in January
2001.
and about its splintering,
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The FLC was only a brief interlude in what was becoming an
increasingly factionalized conict. In June 2001, troops loyal to
Mbusa, who was scheming from afar, launched an attack against
Bemba in Beni, forcing him to ee.
Data 44, 45, 46
A group of former CMF members defected form the MLC in 2001 to join
Lubanga's UPC. In Ref. [63]:
The mutiny marked the return to prominence of the commanders
who had been behind the earlier CMF mutiny. Following their
training in Kyankwanzi (for new recruits) and Jinja (for ocers),
most of them had been sent to Equateur Province to join the
MLC's armed wing. After some months of ghting for Bemba,
the soldiers had grown increasingly frustrated. They knew that
fellow Hema were still dying in Ituri's inter-ethnic clashes, and
they felt that the MLC used them `like dogs'. When the FLC fell
apart in north-eastern Congo, these soldiers|led by Floribert
Kisembo|rebelled in Equateur, demanding to be sent back to
Ituri. Bemba gave in and let them return to Bunia, where they
rallied to Lubanga's side.
Data 47, 48
Masunzu defected from the RCD-Goma in January 2001. Ref. [66] explains
his defection as,
In January 2002, a clash between him and his superior ensued.
Various reasons have been given for this stando: a conict re-
lated to the management of tax revenues; a power struggle be-
tween Masunzu and his superior, Safari; the RCD using Safari
to get rid of Masunzu; and even a drunken dispute over a girl.
Whatever the cause, the result was that Masunzu took to the
hills again, with around 20 followers.
Data 49
Masunzu integrated his group with a political group FRF to for FRF/FRC,
with the FRC the military wing of the FRF in April 2002. Since the FRF
was not an armed group, this event is coded as a change of Masunzu group
into FRF/FRC. In Ref. [66], the event is described as,
In April 2002, along with FRF leaders, he transformed the FRF
into a politico-military movement, with a military branch called
Forces congolaises de resistance (FRC, Congolese Resistance Forces),
which gained popularity among the population of the Plateaux.
64 APPENDIX A. DETAILS OF THE FISSION-FUSION DATA
Data 50, 51
A group led by Kin-Kiey Mulumba defected from the RCD-G to form RCD-
Congo (RCD-C) in 26 July 2002 . Ref. [84] says,
Mulumba and Babadi split away from RCD-Goma after its fail-
ure to join the Kinshasa government, the Ugandan-backed Mou-
vement de liberation du Congo armed opposition group, and a
majority of political opposition parties and civil society organi-
sations, which signed the Sun City accord in South Africa at the
conclusion of the inter-Congolese dialogue in April.
Data 52
The FNI was created in November 2002. It was a Lendu militia group in
Ituri. Ref. [66] says,
Despite disagreements with Lendu elders, who were opposed to
foreign inuence, the Ndjabu group decided to move forward,
informally creating the FNI in late November.
Data 53, 54
A group led by Yves Kahwa defected form the UPC to form the PUSIC in
December 2002. The PUSIC is a Heme militia group in Ituri. Ref. [66]:
Divisions within the UPC emerged in late 2002. In early De-
cember, deputy Minister of Defence Chief Kahwa ed to Kam-
pala. He had become disillusioned by the fact that the Rwan-
dans, while supporting the UPC, were indirectly cooperating
with Lendu groups by supporting the PRA in Kpandroma. For-
mer UPC members also suggest that Kahwa thought he deserved
a more important position within the movement, given that he
had secured Rwandan backing and that the UPC's main power
base, Mandro, was in his chieftaincy.
Data 55, 56
Two Iturian ethnic militia groups, FRPI and FPDC, were formed in late
2002. According to Ref [65], the former \emerged out of several smaller
Lendu militias and were formally established in late 2002." The later was
\launched by Alur and Lugbara from Aru and Mahagi in late 2002" accord-
ing to Ref. [63].
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Data 57, 58
Two Rwandan armed groups, ALIR-2/FDLR and ALIR-2/FDLR, merged
into FDLR/FOCA in 2003. Ref. [56] says, \ALIR and ALIR-2 combatants
only joined their military forces in 2003 in South Kivu, thereby creating the
FDLR’s armed wing, the FOCA, a force comprising more than 10,000 men
at that time."
Data 59 to 64
In 2013, the Second War formally ended. Then, the former warring parties,
RCD-Goma, RCD-K/ML, RCD-N, MLC, Mai-Mai, and FAC merged to
form the new national army. In Ref [65]: \The FARDC was created in 2003
by a merger of the belligerents of the Second Congo War."
Data 65 to 72
Four armed groups in Ituri, PUSIC, FNI, FRPI, and FPDC, formed the
FIPI in February 2003, but it soon broke into the original groups. Ref. [63]
describes its formation as
In late 2002 and early 2003, the Ugandans organized negotia-
tions among all of Ituri's armed groups. When the UPC refused
to sign any agreement with Lendu groups, Uganda helped create
the Front pour l'integration et la paix en Ituri (FIPI, Front for In-
tegration and Peace in Ituri), an alliance that brought together
Kahwa's PUSIC, the Lendu-dominated Front des nationalistes
integrationnistes (FNI, Front of Integrationist Nationalists) and
Force de resistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI, Ituri Patriotic Re-
sistance Force) as well as the Force populaire pour la democratie
du Congo (FPDC, Popular Force for Democracy in the Congo),
which was launched by Alur and Lugbara from Aru and Mahagi
in late 2002.
and its splintering as
The FIPI had eectively ceased to exist shortly after its creation,
not least due to the Lendu attack on Bogoro on 24 February
2003, for which FRPI leader Germain Katanga is currently still
on trial at the ICC.
Data 73, 74
A group led by Jerome Kakwavu defected form the UPC to form the FAPC
on 4 March 2003. In Ref. [63]: \On 4 March, Uganda convinced|or perhaps
forced|Kakwavu to break away from the UPC and create his own armed
group, the FAPC, in Aru and Mahagi."
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Data 75, 76
A group led by Laurent Nkunda defected from the national army in Septem-
ber 2003. He was a former member of the RCD-Goma. In Ref. [60]: \In
September 2003, General Laurent Nkunda and two fellow senior ocers re-
fused to join the newly integrated national army, citing both personal and
community-wide security concerns and a general mistrust of Kinshasa."
Data 77
A group led by Paul Rwarakabije, the former leader of the group, defected
from the FDLR/FOCA to return to Rwanda. While this is a clear change
of the leadership structure, no source suggests that Paul Rwarakabije led an
armed group after he return to Rwanda. Therefore, the event is coded as a
change of a FDLR/FOCA to another FDLR/FOCA, which have the same
name but dierent leaders. In Ref. [86]: \The previous leader, Paul Rwarak-
abije, fell out with the head of the western faction, Sylvestre Mudacumura,
and accepted an oer from the Rwandan government to return."
Data 78, 79
Because of a leadership dispute, the UPC split into two factions, UPC-
Lubanga (UPC-L) and UPC-Kisembo (UPC-K) in December 2003. In Ref.
[63]: \Lubanga' own army chief of sta, Floribert Kisembo, staged a coup in
December 2003, splitting the group into two factions: UPC-Lubanga (UPC-
L) and UPC-Kisembo (UPC-K)."
Data 80, 81
A savage criminalized element of the FDLR, called Rastas, splintered [56].
When it occurred is not clearly mentioned in sources, therefore the uncer-
tainty is coded as 3. The group members committed in abduction on 22
December 2003 [82], therefore the day is coded as the day of splintering as
a rough guide, though the exact time of the splintering must be earlier.
Data 82, 83
The RUD-Urunana/AN-Imboneza splintered form the FDLR/FOCA in 2004.
In Ref. [86]:
The political wing|which at the time was largely based in Europe|
split as the Vice President Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro and Trea-
surer Felicien Kanyamibwa defected to found the Ralliement
pour l'Unite et la Democratie{Urunana (RUD-Urunana).21 The
organisation's military wing followed suit as ocers split o from
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FOCA to create the Armee Nationale-Imboneza (AN-Imboneza),
the RUD's armed wing.
and in Ref. [74]:
The group, which ocially split from FDLR-FOCA in 2004 and
which comprises a few hundred elements, is politically headed
by Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro and Felicien Kanyamibwa, and
the military commander Jean Damascene Ndibabaje (nicknamed
Musare).
Data 84, 85
A group led by Peter `Karim' Udaga defected form the FNI to form his own
group, which was called the FNI-Karim, in 2004 [63, 65]. Ref. [65] describe
Karim's setting up of the group as:
After the rst phase of the DCR programme was launched in
September 2004, the dynamics of violence further shifted from
an inter-ethnic conict to one pitting MONUC and the renamed
Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC,
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo) against
groups resisting disarmament. [...]. When the DCR programme
began, he retreated to the Dhera forest near Kpandroma, set-
ting up a new militia and soon gaining notoriety for banditry
and harassment of civilians.
Data 86, 87
A Banyamulenge group led by Michel Rukunda defected form the national
army in South Kivu [66]. The reason of defection is equivocal, as in Ref. [66],
\Rukunda's defection is also the subject of speculation: some attribute it to
his clan aliation with Mutebutsi, while others say it was because he was
chang under the command of Colonel Mutupeke. However, it seems clear
that Rukunda's poor relations with Masunzu were a factor, as well." When
he defected is not specied by sources, therefore the uncertainty is coded as
3. The year of defection is conjectured to be 2004 because Masunzu demote
Rukunda in 2004 and this betrayal of Masunzu is, as explained the above
quotation, one of the reasons of the defection.
Data 88, 89
A group led by senior Munyamulenge commander Jules Mutebutsi defected
from the national army to form his own group in May 2004. In Ref. [66]:
\Fearing the erosion of the RCD's power in the transitional government,
Mutebutsi rebelled against his commanding ocer in May 2004."
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Data 90, 91, 92
The UPC-K was integrated into the national army when its leader Floribert
Kisembo was appointed a general in the FARDC in 11 December 2004 [49]
Though another source [63] says that his appointment was in early 2005, with
a slight dierence from the indication of Ref. [49], I adopted the information
in Ref. [49] because the reliability of the two sources seems similar and
Ref. [49] indicates more precise time of the event.
Data 93, 94
A splinter faction, Commandement Militaire pour le Changement (FDLR-
CMC), was formed in 2005 by dissident ocers of the FDLR/FOCA [56].
Data 95
The group led by Mutebutsi changed to a group called, Group of 47. Mute-
butsi group went to Rwanda after it mutinied in May 2004 (Data 88, 89)
and spent a year in Rwanda before coming back to the DRC in 2005. Some
change of leadership structure is implied by the fact that Mutebutsi did not
participated in the Group of 47. In Ref. [63]:
Mutebutsi's group, meanwhile, was planning its next move. Af-
ter the Bukavu mutiny, it had been conned to a military camp
in Rwanda in dreary conditions. Finally, after spending over
a year there, a group of 46 of these ocers and one civilian|
the RCD politician Dada Abbas|inltrated themselves into the
DRC across the Rusizi river and climbed into the Moyens Plateaux.
They were led by Colonel Venant Bisogo, not Mutebutsi: the lat-
ter was reported to have clashed with his Rwandan hosts and to
have been detained in Rwanda, where he remains. [...]. As an
indication of the complexity of internal Banyamulenge politics,
the return of the Group of 47, who established themselves as an
insurgent group on the Plateaux under Colonel Bisogo, would
ultimately spark the worst internal ghting the community had
ever seen.
Data 96 to 100
A new group MRC was formed in Ituri in June 2005 by UPC-L, PUSIC,
and FNI, and a part of FRPI. In Ref. [65]:
In March 2005, Ngudjolo was released from prison in Kinshasa
and went back to north-eastern Congo. Together with former
RCD-K/ML commander Frank Kakolele Bwambale (a Nande)
and UPC president Lubanga's former chief of sta Dieudonnre
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Mbuna (a Hema), Ngudjolo then began to rally those FNI, FRPI,
PUSIC, and UPC elements that continued their struggle against
a common enemy, the FARDC and MONUC. The Mouvement
revolutionnaire congolais (MRC, Congolese Revolutionary Move-
ment) was ocially created in Jinja (Uganda) in June 2005.
Ngudjolo became the MRC president and military commander,
whereas Mbuna was named secretary-general, in charge of rep-
resenting the movement on the political stage.
Though a former leader of RCD-K/ML, Frank Kakolele Bwambale, join the
movement, the RCD-K/ML had already ceased to exist after its integration
into the FARDC, and no sources suggested that Kakolele lead any armed
group when the MRC was founded, the MRC was coded as a coalition of
UPC-L, PUSIC, FNI, and a part of FRPI. It was not the entire FRPI that
joined the MRC, and the main faction of the FRPI kept its independence
under the leadership of Cobra Matata. In Ref. [65]: \After Katanga ’s
departure in January, Cobra had become the main leader of the Ngiti militias
in Irumu; it was he rather than Sambidhu who eectively controlled the
FRPI from 2005 to 2007."
Data 101
A local armed group, Raia Mutomboki, emerged in Shabunda in 2005. It
was created and led by Jean Musumbu, a local witchdoctor. We call it Raia
Mutomboki-Musumbu, to distinguish other groups that emerged later and
call themselves Raia-Mutomboki. The month of emergence is not found in
sources but coded as June (with the uncertainty 2), because the event that
is said to have triggered its emergence occurred in June, which is described
in Ref. [64]:
The events that led to the rst small group using the name
Raia Mutomboki now form part of the militia's folklore. On
29 March 2005, a group of local traders was on its way to sell
food to gold miners in Kyoka, a jungle village in the far south
of Shabunda territory. The group was ambushed by FDLR sol-
diers; four traders escaped and alerted a nearby Congolese army
patrol. When together they nally tracked down the kidnapped
party, they discovered that all their 12 colleagues, including two
women and four children, had been killed with machetes.
Data 102, 103
The military wing of FRF/FRC, the FRC, was integrated into the FARDC,
when its leader Masunzu was \sworn in as a general in July 2005" [64]. While
the political wing, FRF, remained to be independent from the government,
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based in Bujumbra, no source indicates that the FRF had the military wing
before its integration with the FDP (Data 118). Therefore, the event is
coded as the integration of the FRF/FRC into the FARDC, rather than
side-switching of the FRF from the FRF/FRC into the FARDC.
Data 104
An armed group, which we call Alexandre/Kyatend group, emerged in south-
ern Shabunda in 2006. The group was led by Mwami Alexandre and Kyatend
Dittman. According to Ref. [64], the former \had been a Mai-Mai comman-
der under General Padiri during the war against the RCD" and the later
was \a Rega musician who had been in Germany since the 1980s, returning
to the Congo in 2003 to try his hand at local politics." Though, Alexandre
was a former Mai-Mai commander, Mai-Mai was integrated into the FARDC
when the Second War ended and it is reasonable to conjecture that he was
demobilized after the integration and returned to civilian or political life,
because no sources indicates that he led an armed groups before he created
the Alexandre/Kyatend group. Therefore, the event is coded as emergence
of a new group, rather than a change of a Mai-Mai splinter faction into the
Alexandre/Kyatend group.
Data 105, 106
A group led by Sangano Musohoke (alias Soki) defected from the RUD-
Urunana/AN-Imboneza in 2006. We call this group FDLR-Soki. In Ref. [86]:
Two years after RUD's split from the FDLR [in 2004], comman-
der Sangano Musohoke (alias Soki) defected with a small number
of troops, founding the FDLR-Soki based in northern Rutshuru
territory of North Kivu. While this group no longer collaborates
with the FDLR, the two have a non-aggression pact.
Data 107 to 112
Two groups led by David Rugayi and Smith Gihanga side-switched from the
Nknuda group to the FARDC, respectively. In Ref. [62]:
In February 2006, the 83rd brigade commander, Major David
Rugayi, led over 1,400 soldiers out of the CNDP and into army
integration. Several months later, the 81st brigade commander,
Colonel Smith Gihanga, also a Hutu, followed suit.
The month in which the group led by Smith Gihanga side-switched is not
specied by the text. Therefore, the uncertainty is coded as 2 and the month
is conjectured to be April because it is several months later than February.
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Data 113
On 26 July 2006, the Nkunda group, another name of which was CMDP,
changed to the CNDP, when Nkunda integrated his armed group with an
political organization Synergie. In Ref. [60]:
During this crucial phase, Nkunda merged his political operation,
Synergie, with his military identity, the CMDP The result was
the CNDP|formally born on 26 July 2006, with Nkunda as both
Chairman and Supreme Commander.
Data 114, 115
The intensive ghting that erupted on 24 November 2006 between the CNDP
and the FARDC led to the temporal integration of the CNDP into the
FARDC in December 2006, which gave the CNDP money and weapons. In
Ref. [62]:
These early, tentative steps to counterbalance Nkunda were ac-
celerated in December 2006, when the rst major ghting be-
tween the CNDP and the national army took place. In order
to defuse the crisis, the Congolese government struck the rst
of several peace deals with the CNDP, resulting in mixage, the
on-site integration of the CNDP into the national army. This
agreement gave CNDP commanders prominent positions in the
Congolese army, raising Nkunda's stature and inuence.
Data 116, 117, 118
The Rkunda group and Bisogo's Group of 47 merged into an armed group,
which we call Rkunda/Bisogo group. Then the armed group merged with
the FRF to form the FRF/FDP, with the FDP its armed wing. The FRF
was a political organization, therefore the event was coded as the change
of the Rkunda/Bisogo group into the FRF/FDP, rather than integration of
two armed groups. In Ref [66]:
In January 2007, Masunzu's troops clashed with Rukunda's Mu-
ramvya faction, killing nine senior ocers. This attack brought
about the merger of Rukunda's faction and Bisogo's Group of 47,
who realized they were too weak to survive separately. This uni-
cation appears initially to have been more driven by strategic
considerations rather than by a shared political vision: Rukunda,
for example, is ercely opposed to Rwanda, while Bisogo main-
tained contacts with top commanders in Kigali throughout this
period. The FRF leadership, then based in Bujumbura with
Gasore Zebedee at its helm, used this opportunity to approach
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the dissidents in view of gaining military leverage for their polit-
ical goals. Eventually they came to a preliminary agreement to
reconstitute the FRF as a politico-military movement; its armed
wing was now called the Force pour la defense du peuple (FDP,
Force for the Defense of the People). Rukunda became its chief
of sta, while Bisogo was made president of the FRF.
When the two events occurred is not specied by the text, therefore the
uncertainty of both events was coded as 3. Both are conjectured to have oc-
curred in January 2007 because they were after the clash between Masunzu's
and Rukunda's factions in the month.
Data 119, 120
A group led by William Amuri Yakutumba defected from the FARDC to
form Mai-Mai Yakutumba on 23 January in South Kivu. The group was
also called Mai-Mai Reforme. It was composed of the former members of
Mai-Mai who had been integrated into the FARDC after the end of the
Second War. In Ref. [67]:
A key gure in this resistance was Captain William Amuri Yaku-
tumba, a battalion commander in the 118th Brigade, one of
Dunia's ex-Mai-Mai units, deployed in Baraka. [...]. On 23 Jan-
uary, Yakutumba and 34 other founding members created the
Mai-Mai Reforme (Reformed Mai-Mai), a name that was chosen
to distinguish themselves from previous Mai-Mai groups.
Data 121, 122
A group of former Mai-Mai militias who had been integrated into the FARDC
defected from the national army to form the PARECO in North Kivu. It was
\a coalition of [former] Mai-Mai militias established on 3 March 2007" [55].
Data 123, 124
The CNDP, which was once integrated into the FARDC in the process of
\mixage", nally defected from the national army again in August 2007.
\In August 2007, the mixage process collapsed, owing to mistrust between
CNDP and FARDC, and PARECO engaged for the rst time in large-
scale military operations. [62]" \As mixage collapsed, ghting broke out as
Nkunda's units separated from the army to defend strategic positions. [60]"
Data 125 to 129
Three armed groups in Ituri (FNI-Karim, FRPI, MRC) were integrated
into the FARDC in November 2007, though part of the FRPI continued its
rebellion. In Ref. [63]:
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Negotiations about the specics of their integration into the
FARDC continued for another year, but in November 2007 their
three main leaders|Peter `Karim' Udaga, Cobra Matata, and
Mathieu Ngudjolo (all Lendu)|nally boarded a plane at Bunia
airport that took them to Kinshasa.
Data 130, 131
A group led by Janvier Karairi Bwingo defected from the PARECO to form
another armed group in April 2008. The group was later called APCLS. In
Ref. [62]:
Around the same time, the Hunde wing of PARECO split o un-
der the leadership of Colonel Janvier Karairi Bwingo. A former
Mai-Mai, Bwingo did not feel bound by the Actes d'engagements,
which had been signed only by Hutu and Nande representatives.
By May 2008, his splinter group had become known as the Al-
liance patriotique pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS,
Patriotic Alliance for a Free and Sovereign Congo), although he
continued to profess his support for PARECO.
Data 132, 133
A part led by Jean-Claude Baraka defected form the FRPI to form the FPJC
in September 2008 [75]. Though remnants of other groups are also implied
to have joined the group, their inclusion in the leadership of the FPDJ is
not pointed out in the sources. Therefore other groups other than the FRPI
were excluded from the participants of the events. In Ref. [63]:
The main Hema commander who chose not to integrate into the
FARDC was Jean-Claude Baraka. In 2008, he reappeared as one
of the leaders of the Front Populaire pour la Justice au Congo
(FPJC, Popular Front for Justice in the Congo), a group that
included FNI, FRPI, PUSIC, and UPC remnants.
Data 134
A new armed group FPLC emerged in North Kivu. It was a small multi-
ethnic group based in Rutshuru and hostile to the Rwandan government. In
Ref. [77]:
According to a former FPLC source, this armed group was rst
established in November 2008 in response to CNDP attacks at
Kiwanja.
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Data 135
A new armed group NDC/Mai-Mai Sheka emerged in North Kivu. In Ref.
[85]:
Formed in 2009 by long-time minerals businessman Ntabo Ntaberi
Sheka in North Kivu's Walikale Territory, Ma Ma Sheka has
150-180 men, mainly army deserters and youths, according to
the Enough Project.
Data 136 to 139
Three armed groups (PARECO, CNDP, Mai-Mai Yakutumba) were inte-
grated into the FARDC. In Ref. [60]:
The agreement was formalized on 23 March 2009 with the formal
signatures by the Kinshasa government of two separate agree-
ments: one with the CNDP, the other with separate armed
groups.
Data 140, 141
The Mai-Mai Yakutumba, which was once integrated into the FARDC, de-
fected form the national army again. The month of defection is not found
in the text, therefore the uncertainty was coded as 2 and the month was
conjectured to be May because the event was in mid-2009. In Ref. [67]:
Integration eventually failed, as the logic of the CNDP integra-
tion further eroded whatever little trust Yakutumba had in the
central government. In mid-2009, the government embarked on a
new oensive against the FDLR, Kimia II. [...]. The Yakutumba
group declared the arrival of these troops to be a provocation and
threatened to restart hostilities, withdrawing all its troops to the
gold-mining area of Misisi, close to Lubondja, Yakutumba's vil-
lage of birth.
Data 142, 143
A group led by Gaston Mugasa (alias Mandevu) defected from the FDLR/FOCA
in 2010. We call the group FDLR-Mandevu. In Ref. [86]: \The last fac-
tion to split from the FDLR was that of Lieutenant-Colonel Gaston Mugasa
(alias Mandevu), in 2010."
Data 144
The Alexandre/Kyatend group came to an end in 2010. The month of
demise is not specied by the text, therefore the uncertainty was coded as
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2 and the month was conjectured to be June because the leaders were in
prison since June. In Ref. [64]:
Kyatend's militia came to an end when the Congolese army ar-
rested Muligi V in 2010. When he called on young people in
his cheerie to turn in their weapons, just 12 were handed over
to the FARDC, an indication of how small the group was. The
local population then captured Kyatend and handed him over
to the government. Both Kyatend and Alexandre have been in
prison since June 2010.
Data 145
The Mai-Mai Yakutumba changed to the PARC/FAAL in 2010. Yakutumba
created a political organization, PARC, with Looba Undji. They integrated
the PARC and Mai-Mai Yakutumba into the PARC/FAAL, with the FAAL
its military wing. In Ref. [67]:
This training was not only military: Yakutumba and Looba
Undji also insisted that ideology, including religion and national
history, be taught. This new emphasis on religion was reected
in the addition of the word‘Allelujah’to the name of the group
at the end of 2010, eventually leading to a formal re-baptizing
of the armed wing as Forces armees alleluia (FAAL, Allelujah
Armed Forces). At the start of 2011, the movement became
known as PARC-FAAL, reecting the increasing importance of
the political wing.
Data 146
An armed group led by Eyadema Mugugu emerged in South Kivu in response
to the FDLR attacks to the civilians in the region. We call the group Raia
Mutomboki-Eyadema/Kikuni to distinguish other Raia Mutomboki groups.
In Ref. [64]:
In early 2011, the local population responded. According to
one version of events, Eyadema Mugugu, a young mineral trader
from Nduma who had been one of Musumbu’s leading followers,
travelled to southern Shabunda to get advice and the magical
dawa from his former leader. Alternative accounts suggest that
Eyadema obtained his rst batch of dawa from the Mai-Mai of
Amuli Yakutumba in Fizi territory. Networks of demobilized
combatants and artisanal miners seem to have been particularly
important in Eyadema’s mobilization but, initially at least, the
main motivation was self-defence.
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Data 147, 148
A group led by several Rega ocers defected form the FARDC in 2011
to form a new Raia Mutomboki group, which we call Raia Mutomboki-
Sisawa/Meshe/Ngandu. In Ref. [64]:
The third group that appeared in Shabunda was the most oppor-
tunistic and internally fragmented. It was launched initially by
Rega Congolese army ocers who were upset by their treatment.
The defectors mostly came from the 11th integrated brigade,
which had an entire battalion made up of ocers without jobs,
the so-called battalion cadre, created by the Congolese army to
regroup ocers who did not have the connections, education, or
physical tness needed to obtain more lucrative deployments.
Data 149, 150
The FRF/FRC, which was sometime called simply FRF, was integrated into
the FARDC on 26 January 2011, when the integration ceremony was held
in Minembwe, South Kivu. In Ref. [66]:
Negotiations started on 18 January 2011 in Kamombo, on the
Plateaux. The FRF succeeded in obtaining a deal that allowed
for the in situ integration of FRF into the Congolese army,
along with the creation of a new operational sector on the Hauts
Plateaux under FRF command. In addition, the government
promised to recognize FRF ranks and their political party, the
appointment of FRF ocers in high-ranking positions, and to
give them $20,000 in cash. [...]. When the FRF arrived in
Minembwe on 26 January for an integration ceremony, they could
muster just 348 ghters, claiming that others had been left be-
hind.
Data 151, 152, 153
A group led by Richard Tawimbi defected from the FARDC in March 2011
to form his own group, which we call Tawimbi group. The group changed
to the MPCC on 26 July in 2011.
In Ref. [66]:
With the FRF integrated, and with several Banyamulenge o-
cers in inuential and lucrative positions, the insurgent networks
in the community have been largely dismantled. However, two
small new groups have emerged since 2011, one led by Richard
Tawimbi, the other, allied to the M23 rebellion, by Muhima
Nkingi. [...]. The now ex-FRF managed to bribe him out of
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jail, but once back in the Kivus in March 2011, he was reluctant
to join a Congolese army dominated by the ex-CNDP, for fear
of being arrested or killed due to his anti-Rwandan track record.
[...]. While the bulk of the FRF integrated in 2011, Tawimbi
split o and founded his own group, the Mouvement populaire
pour le changement du Congo (MPCC, Popular Movement for
Changing the Congo), on 26 July 2011.
Data 154 to 157
Two groups, called Nyatura and PARECO-Fort, defected from the FARDC
in 2011. They were composed of former members of the PARECO, which
had been integrated in the national army. In Ref. [62]:
In August 2011, reports emerged of a group of several hundred
armed youths mobilizing in the Kalehe high plateau, around the
town of Lumbishi. Like many other, unrelated Hutu groups,
they called themselves Nyatura. [...]. The second major splinter
faction, PARECO-Fort, is based around Lukopfu in the central
Masisi highlands. [...]. Its leader is Lieutenant Colonel Marcel
Habarugira Rangira, a former PARECO commander who was
deployed to Walikale after integrating into the army. In October
2011, he deserted from his FARDC unit during the regimentation
process: a deputy brigade commander, he was expecting to be
promoted to battalion commander.
Data 158, 159, 160
A group, called CONSUP, defected form the FARDC in December 2011 but
was dismantled by the Congolese intelligence services in January 2012. In
Ref. [80]:
The Conseil superieur de la paix (CONSUP) was created in De-
cember 2011 following the elections in order to foment unrest
among disgruntled populations who questioned the credibility of
the November vote (see S/2012/348, para. 128).
In Ref. [66]:
The Gasore camp was supported by Colonel Bisogo. This faction|
said to be close to Rwanda and Colonel Sultani Makenga, deputy
commander of the Amani Leo operations in South Kivu before
his desertion in March 2012|is suspected to have participated in
a nebulous movement called Conseil superieur de la paix (CON-
SUP, Superior Council for Peace) in late 2011, which was plotting
an insurrection before being dismantled by Congolese intelligence
services in January 2012.
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Data 161
A new group led by Butu Luanda emerged in North Kivu, which was called
FDC. In Ref. [79]:
FDC is a Congolese armed group which emerged in early 2012
as an important force along the border of western Masisi and
eastern Walikale. Originally created as a local defence organiza-
tion against FDLR and supporters of FARDC operations, FDC
was ocially established under the overall command of \Gen."
Butu Luanda, a self-declared ex-CNDP ocer. FDC took part
in several critical operations against the senior FDLR leader-
ship in the areas surrounding Ntoto and Kimua in January and
February 2012.
Data 162, 163
A group led by Albert Kahasha and Sikuli Lafontaine defected from the
FARDC to form the UPCP on 24 January 2012. In Ref. [60]:
Union des patriotes Congolais pour la paix (UPCP, Union of
Congolese Patriots for Peace): This new group is led by Colonel
Albert Kahasha (aka `Foka Mike') and self-styled General Sikuli
Lafontaine. [...]. UPCP has positions in southern Lubero and in
Rutshuru territory.
In Ref. [79]:
On 24 January 2012, Col. Albert Kahasha, Commander of the
808th regiment deployed in Oicha, north-east of Beni, deserted
from FARDC with an estimated 30 men.[...]. According to Con-
golese intelligence sources, in reality Col. Kahasha had aligned
with PARECO Gen. Kakule Sikuli Lafontaine in Lubero terri-
tory in North Kivu, forming the Union des patriotes congolais
pour la paix (UPCP).
Data 164
A group of the FDLR defected the group to turn themselves over at a
MONUSCO base in North Kivu in 2012. This event is not coded as splin-
tering but as a change of the FDLR/FOCA because the defected group did
not continue to be an armed group but surrendered. In Ref. [86]:
At the same time, Rwandan authorities organized assassinations
of senior FDLR leaders, using two companies of Special Forces
that Kinshasa had allowed to be based clandestinely in Rutshuru
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territory. This surge in assassinations and attacks led to a haem-
orrhaging of top ocers. Following FDLR Chief of Sta General
Mugaragu's assassination in January 2012, for example, approx-
imately 200 combatants defected, along with their dependents
and other refugees.
Data 165, 166
A group of former CNDP ocers who had been integrated into the FARDC
defected the national army in March 2012, to launch a new rebellion in
North and South Kivu. We call this group ex-CNDP. In Ref. [60]:
Lubanga's conviction triggered mobilization in earnest. After a
succession of statements demanding the full implementation of
the 23 March 2009 peace deal and denouncing anti-Tutsi discrim-
ination within the army, ex-CNDP ocers held secret meetings
in Goma and Gisenyi in mid-March. Then the defections started,
simultaneously in North and South Kivu.
Data 167, 168, 169
A group led by Deo Chirimwami defected from the FARDC on 16 March
2012 to join the UPCP, which was led by Albert Kahasha. In Ref. [79]: \On
16 March, Lt Col. Deo Chirimwami defected from the 809th regiment based
near Kanyabayonga and joined Col. Kahasha."
Data 170, 171
The Ex-CNDP was integrated into the FARDC in March 2012. The mutiny
the group had launched failed and the group was forced to be reintegrated.
In Ref. [60]:
Within several days, most ex-CNDP troops had re-defected back
to the army. `The soldiers were tired of seeing their commanders
get rich and not give them anything,' said one ex-CNDP ocer.
`Why risk your lives for commanders you don't believe in?' An-
other commented, `ocers told Ntaganda: \We can do this, we
are prepared." But they weren't.'
Data 172, 173, 174
A faction of the FDLR/FOCA defected from the group to join the Nyatura
in April or May 2012. The month of the side-switching was conjectured
to be April and the uncertainty was coded as 2. In Ref. [64]: \When the
FDLR high command took the decision in April and May 2012 to vacate its
strongholds in southern Masisi due to the Raia Mutomboki attacks, some
FDLR troops integrated into Nyatura groups."
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Data 175
A new group led by Bede Rusagara, which we call MCC/RCR, emerged
in Rusizi Plain in South Kivu. When it emerged was not specied by the
sources, therefore the uncertainty was coded as 3. It is conjectured to be
April 2012, when the leader Bede Rusagara was released from prison. In
Ref. [60], the group is called RCR:
Rassemblement Congolais pour le renouveau (RCR, Congolese
Rally for Renewal): This group of several dozen ghters is led
by self-styled Colonel Bede Rusagara, a member of the Fuliro
community based in the hills above the Ruzizi plain in South
Kivu. A former member of the CNDP, Rusagara was arrested
by FARDC in early 2012 and, with the help of Makenga, re-
leased in April at the beginning of the mutiny. Rusagara has
since put together a ramshackle coalition of soldiers from the
Banyamulenge, Fuliro and even Burundian communities.
In Ref. [66], the group is called MCC: \the Mouvement congolais pour le
changement (MCC, Congolese Movement for Change), a multi-ethnic group
based in the hills overlooking the Rusizi Plain, led by self-proclaimed Colonel
Bede Rusagara, an ex-CNDP ocer from the Fuliro community."
Data 176, 177
A group of former member of Heme militias who had been integrated into
the FARDC defected to form a new armed group COGAI in Ituri in May
2012. In Ref. [63]:
In May 2012, other former UPC combatants re-emerged as mem-
bers of the Coalition des groupes armes de l'Ituri (COGAI, Coali-
tion of Ituri's Armed Groups), an attempt to unite several smaller
militias with the mostly Ngiti FRPI of Cobra Matata, who had
defected from the army and returned to Ituri in mid-2010.
In Ref. [65]:
In the meantime, in May 2012, a group of former PUSIC and
UPC combatants, mostly Hema, asked Cobra to become the
head of a new rebel alliance, the Coalition des groupes armes
de l'Ituri (COGAI, Coalition of Ituri's Armed Groups), which
united several smaller militias that had sprung up in Djugu and
Irumu territories in the wake of the M23 rebellion in North Kivu.
According to a COGAI representative, the idea of the coalition
was born when the combatants heard that Cobra had been asked
to form an alliance with the M23, fearing that he might then grow
powerful enough to attack their villages.
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Data 178, 179
The FDC split in May 2012 into two factions, which we call the FDC and
the FDC-Luanda, with the latter under Luanda Butu. In Ref. [79]:
According to ex-combatants, Gen. Ntaganda's insistence on at-
tacking FARDC, following the start of the ex-CNDP mutiny,
and the theft of FDC salaries by \Gen." Luanda led to divisions
within the group in early May 2012.
In Ref. [60]:
It [the FDC] has since split, due to internal disagreements over
an alliance with Rwanda, but one wing under self-styled General
Luanda Butu still collaborates with the M23.
Data 180, 181
A group of former CNDPmembers who had been integrated into the FARDC
defected to form a new group M23 on 6 May 2012 and launch a new rebellion.
In Ref. [55]:
The M23 movement was formed by veterans of recent armed con-
icts in the DRC and neighbouring Rwanda, and in particular
by members of the DRC’s close-knit Tutsi community in North
Kivu Province. M23 refers to the peace agreement signed on 23
March 2009 between the Kinshasa government and the CNDP
rebel group. [...]. On 6 May 2012 the army mutineers issued a
statement announcing the creation of the M23 movement and
denouncing the failed implementation of the March 2009 agree-
ment. Former CNDP loyalist Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero acted
as the group's political coordinator, while former CNDP colonel
Sultani Makenga led the group's armed wing.
Data 182, 183
The FDLR-Mandevu was integrated into the M23 in 2012. The month of
integration is not specied by the sources, therefore the uncertainty was
coded as 2 and the month was conjectured to be June, which is immediately
after the month of the M23 creation. In Ref. [86]: \Mandevu integrated his
185 combatants into the M23 in 2012 and came to control a small area north
of Goma between Nyiragongo and Nyamuligira volcanoes."
Data 184, 185
A group of former members of the RCD-K/ML who had been integrated
into the FARDC defected to form a new armed group FOLC in Beni, North
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Kivu. When it defected is not specied by sources, therefore the uncertainty
was coded as 3. It was conjectured to be June 2012 because the FOLC forged
an alliance with M23 in June 2012 [79]. The M23 was created in May, and
therefore the FOLC was created in May or June, the later of which was
conjectured to be the case here. In Ref. [60], more details are described:
Force cumenique pour la libeniqration du Congo (FOLC, Ecu-
menical Force for the Liberation of the Congo): This strangely-
named group has been built around members of the former RCD-
ML rebellion in northern Beni territory. It is led by Colonel
Jacques Nyoro and is linked to former Congolese minister of for-
eign aairs, Mbusa Nyamwisi. It has loose ties with the M23, as
well as alleged ties to both Uganda and Rwanda.
Data 186
A group of Banyamulenge created a new armed group, ALEC, led by Akim
Hakizimana Muhoza, in July 2012. In Ref. [79]:
In July 2012, a group of Banyamulenge from the diaspora es-
tablished the Alliance de liberation de l'est du Congo (ALEC),
an armed movement allied with MCC and M23. Its statute pro-
claims that the movement's objective is to \create an indepen-
dent republic of the Kivu" (see annex 35 to the present report).
Data 187 to 190
A group led by Nkingi defected from the FARDC in July 2012 to form a new
armed group, which we call Nkingi group. The group was integrate into the
MCC/RCR in August 2012. In Ref. [66]:
[...] Muhima Nkingi, a young Munyamulenge ocer who defected
from the Congolese army in August 2012. [...]. At rst, Nkingi
headed his own group, but then he joined forces with the Mouve-
ment congolais pour le changement (MCC, Congolese Movement
for Change), a multi-ethnic group based in the hills overlooking
the Rusizi Plain, led by self-proclaimed Colonel Bede Rusagara,
an ex-CNDP ocer from the Fuliro community.
In Ref. [81]:
MCC has sought to recruit Banyamulenge since the beginning of
the M23 rebellion. In July 2012, a Congolese armed forces de-
serter, Nkingi Muhima, himself a member of the Banyamulenge
community, joined MCC and became its spokesperson. \Col."
Rusagara told the Group that currently half of his commanders
were Banyamulenge.
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The two sources contradict each other because the group defected from the
FARDC in August in the former source but it got integrated into the MCC
is July in the later source. Moreover, the former source also notes that
the defection came rst and Nkingi once formed his own independent group
before the integration. It is natural to think the two events occurred in
the two months, though the exact time is not clear. Therefore, as a way
to compromise the two explanations, the defection was conjectured to be in
July 2012 and the integration in August 2012. The uncertainty was coded
as 2 for both events.
Data 191, 192
A group of COGAI members who regarded the group as a failure defected
to form another armed group, MPRC in Ituri in August 2012. In Ref. [63]:
However, COGAI never gained any real momentum. It began
to recruit former UPC combatants in Djugu but failed to obtain
broader support from the Hema community there. As a result
of this failure, several COGAI members launched another group
in August: the Mouvement de Resistance Populaire au Congo
(MRPC, Popular Resistance Movement in the Congo).
Data 193 to 196
Nyatura and PARECO-Fort were partly forced to be integrated into the
FARDC in August 2012. In Ref. [62]:
In August 2012, the national army was forced to take action
against these militias. Ocials in Kinshasa were also worried
that, left to their own devices, the Nyatura could be co-opted
by the M23 and the earlier Hutu-Tutsi alliance could be rekin-
dled. General Gabriel Amisi, commander of land forces, with
the help of Seninga and Turinkinko, constituted a regiment un-
der the command of Habarugira, thereby integrating the bulk
of Nyatura soldiers in the Kibabi and Katoyi areas of southern
Masisi, including some FDLR, into the Congolese army. Other
Nyatura groups, however, in the northern part of Masisi, includ-
ing those under the command of Munyamariba in Mianja and
Bavakure in Mokoto, remain outside army control.
Data 197, 198
The Nkingi group, that had been integrated into the MCC/RCR of Bede
Rusagara, defected from the group, partly because of the tension between the
Fuliro and Banyamulenge communities, which supported Bede and Nkingi,
respectively. In Ref. [66]:
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The alliance between the two groups [Nkingi's and Bede's group]
never solidied, although they collaborated in an attack on the
Luberizi military camp on 16 September 2012. Soon after, grow-
ing tensions made Nkingi part ways with Bede and continue in-
dependently with his own movement.
When it defected is not specied by the text, therefore the uncertainty was
coded as 3. The time of defection was conjectured to be in September 30,
when the last collaboration between them was observed.
Data 199, 200
The MPRC splintered into two factions over the attitude toward the M23
(i.e., pro- or anti-M23). In Ref. [63]:
When the Congolese army dislodged the MRPC from Djugu and
arrested two of its leaders one month later, the movement split
into at least two factions|one opposed, the other very close to
the M23. The pro-M23 faction is led by army defectors Papy
Maki and John Bebwa, both former ocers in the UPC's armed
wing.
When they splintered is not specied by the sources, therefore the uncer-
tainty was coded as 3. The time of splintering was conjectured to be in
October 2012 because it is implied to be soon after the arrest of the two
leader, which was made in September 2012 [87].
Data 201, 202
The M23 split into two factions in late February 2013, which we call M23{
Ntaganda and M23{Makenga. It was a result of the leadership struggle
between Bosco Ntaganda and Sultani Emmanuel Makenga. In Ref. [71] the
details are described:
With Ntaganda relegated to the background, Makenga became
the M23 ’s military commander and public face. But the M23
still revolved around two poles, one loyal to Ntaganda, the other
to Makenga. Its political head, Jean{Marie Runiga, as well as
Baudouin Ngaruye, the deputy military commander, were both
Ntaganda loyalists. Tensions escalated over the fall of Goma
in November 2012, eventually erupting in full{blown violence in
late February 2013, causing further civilian displacement and
suering.
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Data 203, 204
The PARC/FAAL, which had been led by Yakutumba, was integrated into
the FARDC on 23 March 2012, when Yakutumba \arrived in a Congolese
army camp with his 60-member bodyguard, declaring that he was ready to
join the army and serve the nation," after several rounds of negotiations
between the PARC/FAAL and the FARDC [68].
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